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                                                                Abstract 
The coming to power of the Justice and Development Party has marked the start of a more pro-
active Turkish foreign policy which implied a dynamic engagement in the Balkans, an area that 
had been dominated roughly for five centuries by the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s new strategy of 
involvement in the Balkans is largely based on scholar and current Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu’s work Strategic Depth, published in 2001, eight years prior to his assuming office in 
2009. During Davutoğlu’s energetic diplomacy in the years 2009-2014 Turkey made clear its 
ambitions to emerge as a new regional leader in the Balkans. I examine the theoretical concepts 
of Strategic Depth and their actual implementation in diplomatic and soft-power engagement in 
three former Yugoslav states in the Western Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia. My case studies demonstrate that Turkey’s engagement and Balkan policies are led 
by a pragmatic and positive agenda including intense regional cooperation and reconciliation 
initiatives, in addition to more active economic cooperation. The main downside to Turkish 
strategic thought and engagement is a tendency to idealize the legacy of the Ottoman past of the 
region. I argue that Turkey remains an important strategic ally for the US and the European 
Union and should be assisted in its efforts to strengthen regional cooperation. The future of 
Turkish engagement in the Western Balkans will depend on the ability of Turkish politicians to 
dismiss the all too common for the region idealization of the past and place an even stronger 
accent on dialogue and regional cooperation that would include all ethnicities and adherents to 
all religions in the larger Balkan region.  
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           Chapter One 
                                                                Introduction 
            The twentieth century has seen the bloody dissolution of one of the most diverse multi-
ethnic states in Europe. The fall of former Yugoslavia has left three multi-ethnic states that still 
cause concern in the international community because of the looming potential for further 
ethnically-based conflict and animosity: Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Recent developments 
have demonstrated clearly that conflicts and resolutions in each of these three entities tend to 
spill across the border and have an impact on neighboring states. Since the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement in 1995, we have witnessed continuing efforts to obtain sustainable peace and 
development in the region on behalf of the United States, as well as international actors, most 
importantly the United Nations and the European Union, an actor whose power has steadily 
increased since the end of the most bloody conflict in Former Yugoslavia, the Bosnian War 
(1992-1995). 
On the other hand, only one Balkan state has risen to become one of the world’s most 
powerful economies. During the last twelve years Turkey’s development has been marked by the 
coming to power of an ideologically conservative but at the same time economically liberal and 
business-oriented political force, the Justice and Development Party (AKP
1
). It is easy to notice 
Turkey’s growing involvement in the greater region of the Balkans, involvement that can be seen 
as part of this country’s increasingly active foreign policy and quest for regional cooperation and 
involvement with all of its neighboring regions including: the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East, and the Balkans. During the years of AKP rule, a tendency towards more open and 
active foreign policy that has been present since the years of the late prime minister and president 
                                                          
1
 From Turkish Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP). 
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Turgut Özal (1927-1993) has dramatically changed in terms of intensity. Turkey is currently 
seeking active engagement with all its neighbors, as well as virtually all the important actors in 
the greater regions surrounding the country. In this context, it is important to evaluate Turkey’s 
engagement in what is, perhaps, still the most problematic region in the Balkans - the former 
member states of the Yugoslav Federation and in particular Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia  
Turkey’s overall role in the whole region of the Western Balkans has been significant, but the 
focus of this work will be on the above-mentioned potential hotspots, as I will argue that 
Turkey’s role is particularly important with regard to relations between the ethnicities living in 
these countries, and with regard to the future peace, security, and sustainable development of the 
region. 
I shall focus in particular on policies and initiatives dating from the moment when the 
current Foreign Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu assumed office. Mr. Davutoğlu’s previous 
position was that of chief foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan until 
he became the head of Turkey’s Foreign Ministry in May 1, 2009. His Strategic Depth doctrine, 
explained in his work of the same name,
2
 had considerable influence on Turkish foreign policy 
prior to his assuming office, but it is only as Foreign Minister that his theoretical concepts could 
be comprehensively put to the test. 
The recency of these developments requires considerable caution with regard to 
evaluations. However, I believe that there is a sufficient record to conduct a preliminary 
evaluation of the strong and positive sides of Turkey’s strategic engagement and influence in the 
region of the Western Balkans, as well as some important downsides to the theoretical concepts 
of the Stragegic Depth doctrine and their implementation on the ground.  
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While European integration processes are already in a relatively advanced stage in 
several Balkan countries, ethnic peace and stability should not be taken for granted in the greater 
Balkan region, as recent events in Bulgaria point out.
3
 This makes the engagement of a powerful 
actor like Turkey particularly important and worthy of serious analysis. Significant engagement 
in soft power, mediation, and dialogue requires resources that only relatively powerful countries 
and international actors possess. I argue that Turkey’s influence in the Western Balkans is 
comparable to that of the most powerful international actor in Europe, the European Union. 
While Turkey cannot be reasonably seen as competing for influence in the region, I argue that 
Turkish engagement nonetheless carries a lot of importance on a different level. Turkey is seen 
as a big and powerful neighbor with traditional ties to the larger region, a Balkan country sharing 
similar culture and values, and can thus excert influence in a different manner – complementing 
rather than interfering or competing with EU and US efforts to obtain stability.  
While I do not find allegations of a Neo-Ottoman agenda to be entirely groundless, I will 
demonstrate that this issue can be easily related to the very Balkan tendency to idealize the 
historical past of a nation and, as such, should not be overestimated. Turkish engagement in the 
Western Balkans is closely related to the theoretical concepts of the Strategic Depth doctrine but 
it also has very pragmatic motivations and has proven capable of evolving in direct correlation to 
opportunities and experience. According to a Turkish diplomat in Bosnia, Turkey’s foreign 
policy with its neighbors is based on four pillars: high-level political dialogue between countries 
of the region; regional economic integration; respect for multiculturalism, principle of security 
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 “B    zh   p          h     p        v P  v  v=Бой между протестиращи и полицаи в Пловдив ” [A Fight Broke 
Between Protesters and Policemen in Plovdiv] DarikNews.bg, February 15, 2014. 
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for all.
4
 These basic principles guiding Turkish foreign policy in the Western Balkans represent 
an encouraging trend and should be seen as a base for optimism for the future of the region rather 
than a threat to strategic EU and US interests.  
Despite the pitfalls of overestimating an idealized Ottoman past, Turkey is and will 
continue to be well-positioned to lead mediation and reconciliation initiatives because of its 
cultural ties with the ethnicities in the region combined with significant capacities for excercising 
soft power. The latter include unlikely allies to diplomacy such as the increasingly popular 
Turkish TV series. Correctly identifying the strengths and weaknesses of Turkish diplomacy 
would allow us to take advantage of and assist positive initiatives that would bring to more stable 
relations in a Balkan region of fragile cultural pluralism. 
I will begin my argument by presenting the most important elements of the Strategic 
Depth doctrine of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu as presented in his work of the same name, with 
particular attention to his thoughts on Turkish foreign policy strategy in the larger Balkan area. 
Afterwards, I will present the issue of Neo-Ottoman tendencies in Turkish foreign policy under 
AKP rule, in addition to providing some historical background on the matter, as this will prepare 
the ground and allow the reader to better understand the developments in current actual 
initiatives undertaken by Turkey in the region of the Western Balkans.  
After this, I will present the most important initiatives undertaken by Turkey, with a 
strong focus on Turkey’s most active engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in facilitating 
processes of dialogue and communication with Bosnia’s key neighbors: Serbia and Croatia. The 
trilateral consultations mechanisms developed by Turkey, Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-
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Serbia and Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia represent the most concrete example of 
direct Turkish diplomatic engagement in the region. These initiatives, especially the engagement 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, deserve further attention both in terms of academic 
research, as well as in terms of the assesment of the US and the EU strategic interests in the 
region. I will argue that it is of extreme importance to understand correctly the significance of 
such initiatives and the perspective of future developments in this direction, as they represent a 
new trend in Balkan politics that deserves attention and encouragement. The current negative 
developments in Turkey, in particular in the area of basic human rights and freedoms, the 
separation of powers, and the freedom of speech, only demonstrate some of the possible negative 
effects of neglecting and disengaging partners with positive potential in the European 
neighborhood such as Turkey. I also examine the sometimes stark contrast between Turkey’s 
formidable diplomatic potential in the face of its energetic Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu 
and President Abdullah Gül on the one side, with their relentless work guided by a pragmatic and 
optimistic vision, and Prime Minister Erdoğan’s taste for more controversial statements and faux 
pas on the other. 
My brief discussion of Turkish engagement in Kosovo and Macedonia will serve to 
complete the picture of Turkey’s policy in the region and lead to evaluating the potential for 
further policy initiatives and the role that Turkey will likely be playing in the foreseeable future. 
While Turkey’s current internal political turmoil does put into jeopardy the moderate 
successes of its engagement in the Balkans, I argue that there are reasons to believe that the 
tendencies that began before Davutoğlu’s entry into office and were developed into a practically 
implemented strategy afterwards will most likely be maintained even after serious political 
changes within Turkey. Turkey will remain a key partner for the European Union, the United 
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States and the International Community in their efforts to build sustainable peace and economic 
development in the Balkans. 
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Chapter Two 
Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position. An Evaluation of Its Most 
Important Concepts with Regard to the Topic 
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s work entitled Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position while 
arguably being one of the most important works on international relations and foreign policy 
strategy in the greater Balkan and Middle East regions at the moment, unaccountably, has not yet 
been translated into English.
5
 Before I go on to analyze the most important ideas of this work 
with regard to our subject, I must note that arranging for an English edition to be published in the 
US or Western Europe should be a matter of urgency and the present situation can by no means 
be accepted as normal. Had I not had achieved a reasonable fluency in Turkish, this essential 
source would have remained inaccessible for my research. 
In the chapter on Strategic Planning and Political Will Davutoğlu argues that strategy is 
crucial for the successful outcome of any initiative in foreign relations.
6
 In the aftermath of the 
Cold War, he argues that a country needs diplomacy and strategy that are both flexible and 
characterized by a strong will to defend national interests.
7
 The important thing to note here is 
the desire of Turkey to turn from subject of international relations into an actor: the analogy used 
by Davutoğlu is that a country without a national strategy in its foreign policy can be seen as a 
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 Modern Greek and Arabic translations of the work have already been published. Apparently, the immediate 
neighbors of Turkey understood better the importance of this new doctrine that has had an immense impact on 
diplomatic developments in the region for quite some time. See Ahmet Davutoglu,          g    v  h    h  
    h     h                  Var                    P                   Ahmet Davutoglu,   -       -           
                -dawrh       -    h   -duwaliyah (B         -      -        h    -       2011). 
6
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7
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chess piece, while a country that has adopted one and has the political will to support and 
implement it can be seen as a chess player.
8
 
In the preface to his work Ahmet Davutoğlu argues that “the greatest challenge to the 
determination and reevaluation of Turkey’s strategic position after the Cold War period”9 is the 
fact that the country is undergoing “extremely dynamic developments” within itself in an 
environment already abundant in “extremely  dynamic developments.”10 Davutoğlu argues that it 
is important to build a strategy that would allow for better understanding and usage of Turkey’s 
position in international affairs. Comparing developments in society and politics to a river, 
Davutoğlu argues that the scholar’s task is to analyze “the river bed, speed, direction of flow, and 
relations to other rivers” in order to “depict, explain, make out the meaning, and redirect the 
flow” of the river.11 He sees his work as a natural continuation and product of his cultural and 
educational background rather than an innovation of his own.
12
 The introduction interestingly 
ends with the statement that his work represents “in terms of time, a bridge from history to the 
future and in terms of space from the center to the periphery”.13 The most logical way to interpret 
this thought is by tying it to the idea of reconnecting with the Ottoman historical and cultural 
heritage, combined with reconnecting the former political center of the Empire with Balkan 
communities that are seen as connected to this cultural and historical heritage. 
                                                          
8
 Ibid. 
9
 This and all subsequent quotations from Strategic Depth are my own translations from the original edition in 
Turkish. As I already noted above, there is no English translation of the work published as of May 2014. 
10
   v   ğ          V  This point has recently become quite relevant with the unfolding of the Ukraine Crisis. See 
  v   ğ  ’    c         v         R   “  ş ş     B       h      v   ğ    R ’  ” [I    v    W  h F    g  M        
  v   ğ       R ]. Interview by TRT 1. Internet Video Stream, March 2, 2014. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJIVgIlXmSM. 
11
 Ibid., VI.  
12
 Ibid. VII. 
13
 Ibid. 
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In Davutoğlu’s words, it is impossible to evaluate Turkey’s international position and its 
potential influence on different points of crisis without taking into consideration the fact that 
Turkey is a “modern nation-state found on the Ottoman heritage”.14 In addition, Turkey is seen 
as situated in an area where interaction of the main geopolitical zones takes place.
15
 Davutoğlu 
argues that in order to determine the international position of Turkey today, one has to consider 
the “historical and geographic depth” of the country.16 He explains that Turkey holds certain 
human resources
17
 with “deep historical experience” who have had an effect on politics, the 
social structure, and cultural particularities in the country. In addition, these human resources’ 
“historical depth”, according to Davutoğlu, has had its influence on the country’s foreign 
policies.
18
 Here Davutoğlu likely refers to the different ethnic groups that have come to the 
political centers of the Ottoman Empire and later the Turkish republic after the wars of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and have always had a pronounced influence in all 
spheres of life.
19
 
In Strategic Depth Davutoğlu importantly argues that the Cold War period had 
established a conjuncture of more static international relations where the historical and 
geographic depth of Turkey remained in the background. In contrast, after the end of the Cold 
War, the new international conjuncture has allowed the resurfacing of these historical and 
geographic particularities not only of Turkey but also for the entire Balkan region. According to 
Davutoğlu, the chaos occurring in the Balkans after the end of the Cold War is one of the “most 
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 Ibid. p. 6-7. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
17
 O  ‘h             ’       p  8  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 This is a valid argument historically as the family origins of most of the crucial figures of the Young Turk 
Revolution of 1908 laid outside of the Anatolian hinterland and Istanbul. See Erik-Jan    ch  , “ h      g        
Children of the borderlands? ” International Journal Of Turkish Studies 9, no. 1/2 (January 2003): 275-285. 
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striking examples of that [development].”20 In this situation Turkey is seen both as a “pivotal 
country in the focus of universal and regional strategies” and a “torn country” in terms of its 
identity.
21
 We have to note that these words of Davutoğlu sound particularly current with regard 
to the situation we have at present in Turkey: the country seems more divided than ever at the 
moment but manages to continue very active foreign policies.
22
 
Davutoğlu believes that the complexities of Turkey’s geostrategic location and its 
Ottoman past can be turned into a power and used to gain leverage in international relations.
23
 
He sees three potential forms of behavior in international relations. The first is a more static 
behavior based on established norms that seeks to stay out of dynamic developments and awaits 
a re-established equilibrium to retake its place in the international system. This approach is 
perhaps comparable to the more traditional isolationist stance of Turkey that dominated Turkish 
foreign policy prior to Özal’s coming to power.24 A second stance would be based on complete 
compliance with the dynamism of international developments, turning the country into an 
“object” of international developments. The third strategy would utilize the country’s own 
dynamism’s potential combined with the “potential of international dynamism” in order to gain 
power in international relations.
25
 Davutoğlu argues that the third approach to international 
relations allows for the optimal use of each and every moment or development as the latter is 
                                                          
20
   v   ğ         9  
21
 Ibid. 
22
 At the same time, if we look at the historical perspective, the Ottoman empire was even more torn in terms of 
its multiple identities until its very end and dismantling at the end of World War I. 
23
   v   ğ           -      v     h                   “Re-imagining the Ottoman past in Turkish politics: past and 
p        ” I   gh           5 3      3    85  
24
 Prior to the late 1960s Turkey simply followed the guidance of its Western partners in exchange for security 
guarantees against the perceived Soviet threat, see Graham E. Fuller, The new Turkish republic: Turkey as a pivotal 
state in the Muslim world (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008): 33-37. 
25
   v   ğ           -11. 
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seen to “carry the potential to shape the future” and hence “an opportunity not to be missed”.26 
This activist strategy gives substantial advantages, as the other two approaches do not allow for 
the potential opportunities brought by dynamic developments to be used in the first case or turn 
the country into a “subject” rather than an agent in international developments in the second. 
This concept of three possible modes of behavior and approach to international relations 
is particularly important both in the context of Turkey’s own past which gravitates towards the 
first strategy mentioned and in the context of the history of all the small Balkan states. Davutoğlu 
argues for the need of showing character in international relations and appreciating one’s own 
potential. The diverse nature and complex identities of a nation, in this case Turkey, are seen as 
carrying actual potential that has to be used rather than ignored. This concept connects, as we 
shall see later, with the ideas of “regional ownership” of peace initiatives and the problems in the 
Balkans being solved by the Balkan countries themselves.
27
 Davutoğlu talks about the 
“whirlpool” of dynamic international developments, a “whirlpool” avoided by the first, blindly 
joined by the adherents of the second strategy, while those who pick the third approach are seen 
as “agents who try to facilitate the transition from chaos to cosmos.”28 In the future Foreign 
Minister’s29 words, Turkey is at an “important historical crossroad” that brings the opportunity of 
a “breakthrough” in its role in the region if it chooses to use the complexities of its historical 
heritage and geographical location, what Davutoğlu calls “historical and geographic depth.” He 
underlines a certain “shortage of strategic theoretical base” that needs to be overcome.30  
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 Ibid., 11. 
27
 See the case studies of the Trilateral Consultations Mechanisms in Chapter Four below. 
28
   v   ğ             
29
 The work is written eight years prior to his appointment as foreign minister. 
30
 Ibid. 
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After a succinct discussion of some of the most prominent political science and 
international relations theorists, Davutoğlu importantly notes the decreasing importance of 
ideologies providing legitimacy ground for nation-states combined with the increasing influence 
of traditional cultural values to the field of international relations and on the countries’ position 
in the international community.
31
  
Davutoğlu also discusses some key international relations concepts such as “national 
sovereignty”, “zones of strategic influence”32, “geo-cultural and geopolitical loops”33, “core 
areas”, and, finally “shatter areas.”34 After introducing the concepts, Davutoğlu gives some 
historical examples of this sort of Great Power interaction. What is important for our purposes   
is that one important “shatter zone” is still considered to be the Balkans35 and, in particular, more 
unstable countries like the Yugoslav successor states.
36
 A political analyst from Bosnia points 
that “the states that emerged from the former SFRY are on the threshold of new Balkan and 
European integration processes.”37 It would be useful to keep this in mind when examining the 
cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. 
Perhaps one of the most salient concepts for Turkish foreign policy introduced in 
Davutoğlu’s strategic work is that of the increased importance of the Ottoman Heritage after the 
end of the Cold War: “Turkey’s engagement during the last ten years in the Balkans, as well as 
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 Ibid., 15. 
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 In Turkish stratejik yayılım alanları. 
33
 In Turkish jeokültürel ve jeopolitik hatlar. 
34
 In Turkish jeostratejik çatışma kuşakları. All the quotes     h   p   g  ph            v   ğ          9-20. 
35
 "Balkan identity may obliterate Brussels link; Specific regional geopolitics lurk behind the goal of a unified 
Europe," The Irish Times. May 29, 2013 Wednesday. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
36
 Anton Gosar, "The Shatter Belt and the European Core - A Geopolitical Discussion on the Untypical Case of 
Slovenia," GeoJournal 52, no. 2 (10, 2000): 107-117. 
37
 Glas Srpske [Voice of RS], “F    g    v   ‘        ’    R   v  B            PM,” BBC M        g     p   
August 26, 2007.. 
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in the Caucasus regions is fundamentally related to this historical heritage.”38 According to 
Davutoğlu, there are certain “elements”39 of the Ottoman heritage in the peninsula, referring to 
the Bosnian Muslims, the Kosovar Albanians and all Muslim minorities in the Balkans. These 
peoples, under the pressures of the dynamic changes in the region brought by the “geopolitical 
vacuum” [after the cold war], turn their attention to the Ottoman Heartland [referring to 
Istanbul]. Turkey, being a nation-state founded “on the base of the Ottoman historical heritage” 
has to face the “geopolitical and geocultural responsibilities associated with this fact.”40 
Davutoğlu further states: “In the forthcoming period, together with certain commitments, these 
responsibilities will bring new horizons and opportunities to Turkish foreign policy; they will 
serve as elements shaping Turkish strategic thought and identity.”41 He importantly notes that 
countries living an identity and cultural crisis are bound to be trapped in a “strategic deadlock,”42 
most likely referring to Turkey’s previous stance on its own cultural identity completely 
detached from the country’s Ottoman past, as opposed to a more integrated national identity 
based on historical continuity in the cases of important European powers like Germany and 
England. 
Davutoğlu invokes several standard means of Turkish leverage on regional politics.  He 
sees Turkey’s young population as a source of strategic leverage to the country but also argues 
that it is one of the main reasons for Germany’s reserved position with regard to Turkey’s bid for 
membership in the EU. Turkey’s intensely developing economics, technology and science, and 
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 I        h ‘        ’  
40
 Ibid. 
41
   v   ğ           -23. 
42
 Ibid., 23. 
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military capacities are also underlined as sources of strategic leverage in the region.
43
 Davutoğlu 
rightfully notes that in modern times relations between international corporations may influence 
international events to a larger degree than relations on interstate level.
44
 Indeed, Turkey is 
arguably economically the most powerful country in the larger Balkan region and this determines 
to a large extent its active role and leverage in regional relations.
45
 
The most important framing of the regional context however is a dynamic historical one. 
Davutoğlu makes the plausible argument that there is certain continuity in the development of a 
national “strategic mentality”46 that transcends the turmoil of political changes. Thus, after 
giving the examples of Germany and Russia, he argues that Turkey is no different in this respect 
and should “come face to face” with and reevaluate “the continuity and change aspects of 
Ottoman-Turkish strategic thought”. Davutoğlu argues that only societies with “established 
strategic mentality” who are also able to create “new notions, means, and forms” to interact in 
the international sphere “gain the ability to influence the power balance in international 
affairs”.47 In addition, he states that societies who have been through a “radical break of their 
strategic thought” and have “destroyed their [previous] national identity” jeopardize their very 
existence and “isolate themselves from human knowledge and marginalize themselves.”48 Thus, 
we see that Davutoğlu is arguing for a more reasonable national strategy that builds upon 
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 Ibid., 24-29. 
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 Ibid., 25. 
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 Dimitar Bechev, "Turkey in the Balkans: taking a broader view," Insight Turkey. 14 (1) (2012): 141-142. 
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 Ibid. 
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historical experience rather than attempting to build its foreign policy anew, most likely implying 
republican Turkey’s previous experience.49 
Davutoğlu argues that Turkey’s historical heritage, geographic location, and cultural 
characteristics together with its human resources including immigrant communities from just 
about all the countries of the larger geographic regions surrounding the country, in particular the 
Balkans, put it into a position that a lot of countries would “be jealous of” but that it is up to 
Turkey’s leaders to transform this potential into leverage that can be used in international 
politics.
50
 
Further in the work it is already possible to note some negative aspects of the new 
Turkish diplomatic strategy in this relatively early work, such as the idealization of the 
controversial final ruler of the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and the argument that 
the Second Constitutional Period of 1908 brought a chain of events that led to the collapse of the 
Empire.
51
 We will see in the subsequent chapters how idealizing the Ottoman past, in particular 
some of its negative aspects and controversial historical figures, will have a detrimental effect on 
otherwise very successful diplomatic openings in the Balkans. This theme tracked in 
Davutoğlu’s work, as well as in some of his public speeches, has led some scholars to call him 
“the Grand Vizier of New Turkey.”52 While it is beyond the scope of this work to prove that the 
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 With the 1980s Bulgarian Turks Expulsion from Communist Bulgaria and the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 seen as 
disasters to a large extent caused by this lack of continuity. 
50
   v   ğ         36-37. 
51
 Ibid., 35. 
52
 Laure Marchand, “L  g     v z            v            ,” [The Grand Vizier of New Turkey] Le Nouvel 
Observateur No2365. March 4, 2010. While the author of this particular article gives an overly positive assessment 
     v   ğ  ’   p    g      p  -active policies, many other journalists and scholars from the Balkans see anything 
that can be called Neo-Ottoman, if sometimes wrongly, as overly negative. See, for instance Aleksiev, Aleks. 
“I        z  h      g             -     =Истината защо българите сме най-бедни,” [The Truth About Why 
Bulgarians Are the Most Poor] Bulgariautre.bg. January 5, 2014. http://www.bulgariautre.bg/2014/01/05/201766-
istinata_zashto_bulgarite_sme_nay_bedni. 
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Second Constitutional Period and the Young Turks Revolution of 1908-1909 were attempts to 
save the Empire, I will say that it is simply not serious from historiographical point of view to 
simplistically argue that Abdul Hamid II was a good ruler and that it was the 1908 events that led 
to the eventual collapse of the empire.
53
 In Davutoğlu’s defense, we must say that his portrayal 
of Abdul Hamid II does include some negative sides of his policies
54
 but nevertheless falls short 
of realistically assessing this leader’s legacy and in particular its negative perception  in the eyes 
of nearly all Christian populations in the Balkans.
55
 
It is important to evaluate correctly Davutoğlu’s assessment of the significance of the 
Ottoman historical legacy. As we will see further in this work, alongside with the idealization of 
certain moments and key figures in Ottoman history, Davutoğlu also points to some of the 
obvious characteristics that do position the country differently in the eyes of its Balkan allies, 
such as the fact that the Ottoman Empire did not follow a systematic exploitation of the resources 
of subjected peoples policy similar to other empires of the time (such as the British Empire).
56
 
Had this not been the case it would have been difficult to imagine that Turkey could ever be seen 
as “one of us”, as former Croatian Ambassador in Ankara Zoran Vodopija puts it.57 
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Davutoğlu sees Turkey’s traditional ties with all the Balkan Muslims and, in particular, 
with the Bosnians and the Albanians who have the distinction of having their own states
58
, as 
very natural. He argues that Turkey’s influence in the Balkans is related to the preservation of 
these Muslim minorities (or, in the cases of Kosovo, Albania, and Bosnia majorities) and the 
normal functioning of their states. In Davutoğlu’s eyes, these minorities are to be seen as a 
responsibility for Turkey, the same way as Balkan Christians were often perceived in the past as 
groups that would naturally fall under the protection of Christian powers like Russia, Great 
Britain, or France up to the early 20
th
 Century. In the context of the mass repressions and 
expulsion of Bulgarian Turks by the Zhivkov regime in the late 1980s and particularly in the 
aftermath of the genocide against Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, it would be normal to expect 
that an emerging Balkan regional power such as Turkey with a Muslim population and historical 
ties to these regions would adopt protective policies towards Muslim minorities in the region. 
Turkey’s position of patron of these groups is neither a positive nor a negative development, it is 
dictated by historical realities and Turkey’s recent emerging as a regional power. 
Davutoğlu rightfully notes that in the recent past there has been a tendency to ignore the 
problems of Muslim minorities in the Balkans, in particular in Bulgaria until the latest 
repressions against the Turkish and Muslim minorities in Bulgaria during the last period of 
Zhivkov’s rule in the late 1970s and in the 1980s when it simply became impossible to continue 
ignoring the problem.
59
 At the same time, it appears that there is an over-emphasis of the 
importance of these cultural ties, especially with regard to their ramifications for Turkish foreign 
policy in the area. A certain tendency to over-estimate the extent of such solidarity and support 
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from the side of the so-called Muslim allies goes back to Ottoman times and will be examined in 
more detail in the following chapter.
60
  
For the moment, it is important to note that the cultural and social ties between the 
Muslim minorities in the Balkans and Turkey are, indeed, “natural” as Davutoğlu points.61 They 
are based on a “common historical culture” and carry obvious benefits for Turkey’s strategic 
interests in the region. At the same time, I don’t see a reason why this should be seen as a source 
for worries or necessarily a Neo-Ottoman side of Turkey’s new foreign policy strategy but rather 
as a natural ambition to seek consistency and take advantage of the historical, cultural, and 
geopolitical characteristics of the country rather than a complete rupture with the Ottoman past 
of Turkey with all the consequences of that in terms of foreign policy. Turkey’s historical past 
and its position as a heir to the Ottoman Empire in addition to the fact that the predominant 
religion in the country remains Islam are a historical given. Should there be any strategic benefits 
to this given, it is only normal that a pragmatic foreign policy would seek to capitalize on it 
rather than simply ignore it. At the same time, Turkey is well aware of its limitations and has not 
given up on its bid for full membership in the EU or its commitments as a key ally of the US.
62
 It 
is simply striving to establish its new position in the surrounding region that would reflect 
historical reality and the country’s increased economic potential. In fact, as we will see in 
Chapters Four and Five, one of the main goals of its increased activism in the Western Balkans is 
facilitating the building of good neighborly relations, a necessary precondition for membership 
in the EU, an aspiration common for all states in the region. This has been accompanied by a 
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commitment to support each-other in this aspiration. The commitment to strive for Euro-Atlantic 
integration of the entire region could hardly be reconciled with any alleged Neo-Ottoman 
agenda. 
As somebody with firm Balkan origins,
63
 I understand very well why Turkish invocation 
of the Ottoman historical heritage in this region would be met with suspicion. At the same time it 
is only reasonable to see the patronage of contemporary Turkey of the Muslim minorities in the 
Balkans in light of their recent troubled past in the hands of more powerful Christian peoples. In 
other words, if we are to remember the mass repressions against the Turkish and Muslim 
minorities in Bulgaria in the 1980s, as well as the repressions, war, and ethnic cleansing of the 
Bosnian Muslims and the Kosovar Albanians in the 1990s, the patronage of a powerful Balkan 
country that is also Muslim should be seen as a normal reaction on the part of Turkey, rather than 
a clear sign of Neo-Ottoman agenda. If we look at this practice in historical context, it would be 
easy to find parallels in the patronage of Bulgarian Orthodox Christians from the side of Russia 
and, at times, even the public in Great Britain, France, and other countries as remote as New 
Zealand. At the same time, for various reasons, the Baghdad Jews, as well as many subjects of 
the Ottoman Empire who were Jews were under the patronage of Great Britain.
64
 In this context, 
Turkey’s protection for Muslim minorities in the Balkans can be seen as a natural phenomenon. 
These groups also have strong cultural and social ties with Turkey because of the developments 
from the recent and more remote historical past. It is important to note that there have been 
multiple waves of migration of Ottoman Turks and other Balkan Muslim minorities to the 
receding Ottoman Empire since the nineteenth century. They have been motivated by repressions 
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and the fear of repressions of the advancing new national states.
65
 These waves of migration have 
continued in the twentieth century which has provided for large subcultures of Macedonian 
Turks, Turks from Western Thrace
66
, Albanians from Kosovo, Bulgarian Turks and others. 
While the Zhivkov regime repressions gained publicity in the 1980s and have provided for the 
single most numerous migration, there have been many more smaller waves from Bulgaria and 
the other regions mentioned. The subcultures of these immigrants provide for natural cultural 
bonds that do have strategic implications for Turkish foreign policy in the region.
67
 Turkey’s 
aspiration to protect the remaining Balkan Muslim minorities should be seen as a normalization 
of its position in the region and as a reality that will likely not change in the foreseeable future. 
As long as it is combined with a credible outreach to all the ethnicities in the region and a policy 
of seeking settling of differences through negotiation and reconciliation,
68
 Turkey’s cultural ties 
and engagement with Muslim minorities should be used to advance the causes of obtaining 
sustainable peace and security in the region rather than being seen as a reason for concern with 
Turkey as a political ally of the US, the European Union, or even the Balkan states for that 
purpose.
69
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Another important moment to note here is that the peoples that Davutoğlu calls “natural 
allies”70 should not be assumed to either support Turkish policies unreservedly, or affiliate with 
an idealized Ottoman past. I will examine this in more detail in the next chapter but for the 
moment I will mention that two of the most important revolts against Ottoman authorities in the 
19
th
 century were organized respectively by the Bosnian Muslims and the Albanians, both 
Muslim and Christian: the Great Bosnian Uprising in 1831-1833 and the League of Prizren in 
1878-1881.  
While this concept of the Ottoman past, its legacy, and its importance in the building of 
new international and interethnic relations in the Balkans can be seen as idealistic, Davutoğlu 
also puts a strong accent on the present historical moment in the development of new relations 
and power balance in the region. Turkey’s future energetic foreign minister argues in 2001 that 
this is a moment of new beginnings in “regional power balance” and that powers that 
demonstrate “the ability to use these new dynamics in a flexible and swift manner would 
increase their influence while countries that remain passive would lose their quality of decisively 
influencing local events and fall into isolation.”71 While it is clear that he is referring to Turkey 
or to the Turkey he wants to see implementing his strategy in the first case, it remains unclear 
which Balkan power he is referring to in the second instance – perhaps, Greece, although I would 
argue that Turkey’s policy of non-interference in neighbor affairs and of relative passivity has by 
no means been an exception in the larger region and it would be hard to argue that anything has 
changed dramatically in Balkan international affairs after the so-called “Fall of Communism” 
except for low-intensity regional cooperation initiatives. This is largely due to the economic 
hurdles of virtually all countries in the region. The only other Balkan economy of some 
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significance is that of Greece but it would be unrealistic to expect any serious engagement of this 
country before it solves its internal economic and administrative capacity issues. This is just 
another reason to believe that his point is very valid in the historical context of the Balkans and 
the timing is, indeed, very suitable for Turkey to become more active and engaged in the region, 
even more so with regard to the fact that Turkey is the only country in the larger region with a 
really powerful economy. The sheer size and the level of development of Turkish economy will 
be impossible to approximate to by any Balkan power in the foreseeable future.
72
  
It is understandable that only a country with strong economy can afford intense activism 
and hope to influence events in the region. Davutoğlu pays relatively little attention to this 
particular factor determining Turkish foreign policy strategy, partly because his work is dated 
2001, significantly before the economic boom that took place during the initial years of AKP 
rule. He does, however, point to the very important geoeconomic position of Turkey, 
emphasizing its close proximity to some of the most important energy sources, as well as the 
potential to participate in the distribution of these resources and their rechanneling towards the 
west.
73
 
Perhaps the most important idea of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy strategy monograph is the 
consistent theme that Turkey should occupy its natural place in international relations in the 
region with self-esteem and without allowing negative memories of the past to condemn any 
future engagement. On the contrary, he stresses the importance of evaluating the Ottoman 
historical and cultural legacy, learning from the lessons it brings but also building on the 
strategic benefits of its traditional ties to the larger Balkan region. Davutoğlu rightfully argues 
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that had major European powers of today such as France and Germany paid too much attention 
to their defeats throughout history with all their consequences (in the case of Germany only 55 
years had passed between the rout and humiliation of Nazi Germany and its division into two and 
the writing of Davutoğlu’s work), they would never have gotten to their current position of 
undisputed European leader-countries, leading the way for one of the most powerful 
international organizations and international actors that is the European Union.
74
 
Davutoğlu discusses the more passive role Turkey plays on the international scene after 
the establishment of the Republic of Turkey noting that in this period Turkey becomes “part of 
the Western Axis”.75 While he does point to some pragmatic reasons for this stance, he also 
stresses the dramatically changing conditions after the fall of the Soviet block and the Berlin 
Wall noting that the changes in power balance during this period allows for countries that 
manage to evaluate the situation to increase their influence and importance in international 
affairs.
76
 In order for Turkey to achieve that and to take this step successfully it needs to “couple 
its rich historical experience, geopolitical and geoeconomic facilities with rigorous and 
consistent internal political reform” strengthening its “international position and forming its own 
zone of influence”.77 
Turkey possesses a strikingly different political culture, as opposed to the more stable 
political systems in Western countries. In Turkey, Davutoğlu argues, the dynamics of internal 
political life reflect “an intense transformation happening inside society”.78 He argues that a 
consistent tradition has been established throughout history to impose certain radical reforms 
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“from the center to the periphery” (meaning the political center)79 aiming at a transformation of 
society in the direction of another civilization, generally referring to Western Europe. The 
pattern was repeated with a much greater intensity with the reforms of the first years of the 
Republic. Here Davutoğlu notes that despite the great sacrifices associated with the radical 
reforms undertaken by Atatürk and his successors, Turkey is never allowed to occupy its place in 
the alliance it has been aspiring to and has remained isolated by this Western civilization circle,
80
 
remaining “neither a colonized country with little historical experience, or an established, central 
country with a steady political system.”81 
Indeed, while there has been a rather lively discussion among scholars, as well as among 
politicians from EU member states and even EU officials on this matter, it is widely accepted 
that Turkey’s bid for a full membership in the European Union is a matter of controversy. As 
prominent Turkish scholar Kemal Kirişçi points, Europe has been divided into two camps: those 
in support of Turkey’s bid and countries with a large disagreement on the bid or even some 
expressing open disapproval like: Austria, France, and Germany.
82
 Kirişçi talks about Turkey 
seen as the “other” or Turks seen as “the “others” of Europe.”83 While it would be difficult to 
argue that there are any strategic benefits to the exclusion of Turkey from the European 
community in the face of European Union, the question of whether Turkey belongs in Europe as 
a full member is still the subject of debate.
84
 It is interesting to note that many of the supporters 
of Turkish accession to the Union cite certain advantages that Davutoğlu discusses in his work, 
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such as Turkey’s traditional ties with the Muslim world, or the community of the Turkic peoples, 
the so-called “Turkic world”,85 large communities of people to which Turkey has the strategic 
advantage of reaching out, in addition to the advantages brought by its geopolitical location.
86
 
In Davutoğlu’s eyes, the geopolitical location of Turkey, connecting the Anatolian 
peninsula with the mainland of Europe, the possession of the straits at Istanbul that control the 
traffic between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, as well as its location between the 
Caucasus and the Middle East with Europe both by land, as well as important sea routes make 
for a formidable ally in geopolitical and strategic terms.
87
 
One of the most important points made in Strategic Depth and a central idea of 
Davutoğlu’s strategic concept for Turkish foreign policy is the necessity to end in a definite 
manner the policy of relative isolation from Balkan matters in the country’s aspiration for closer 
cooperation with Western Europe. Instead, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey’s political, economic, 
and cultural leverage in the international community will continue to be related directly to its 
established and perceived influence and “performance” in neighboring regions, including the 
Balkans.
88
 
In conclusion, I will say that certain points made in Strategic Depth can be seen as dated, 
as realities in the Balkans have changed rather significantly since 2001: relations between Balkan 
countries have to a certain degree improved, certainly in a good direction with regard to Turkey’s 
role in the region. Turkey has already established itself as an important factor in regional politics 
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and as a protector of the rights and culture of Muslim minorities in the region, whereas 
Davutoğlu argued back in 2001 that Turkey should take care to avoid remaining isolated against 
a new Balkan alliance [between Serbia and Greece, and, possibly, Bulgaria].  
Turkey has begun a one-way process of establishing itself as a center of influence in the 
region, providing balance in international and interethnic relations with regard to other 
influential actors like Russia, the EU, and the USA.
89
 At the same time, let us note that as far 
back as 2001, as stated in Davutoğlu’s doctrine, Turkey has set as a goal the protection of the 
internal security and the territorial integrity of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia.
90
 I would argue that Albania could hardly be seen as threatened with regard to any of 
the two mentioned factors as of 2001. The reference here to Albania and Albanians very much 
leads us to think that what Davutoğlu really refers to is the yet unstable Kosovo. As we will see 
in the subsequent chapters, Turkey’s engagement in the region after Davutoğlu’s coming to 
office as a foreign minister gives us serious clues to believe that that is the case. He argues that 
Ottoman’s pull out of the Balkans has brought with itself the formation of “points of conflict”91: 
what he mainly refers to here are the following regions: Bosnia and Herzegovina
92
, Kosovo
93
, 
and Macedonia
94
. Bosnia is still torn between its three constituent peoples: the Bosnian Muslims 
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or Bosniaks, the Serbs, and the Croats.
95
 Kosovo is now ruled by its Albanian majority but 
continues to experience some tensions with its small but not insignificant Serbian and Gorani 
minorities. Macedonia, on its side, has continued to face problems with its sizeable Albanian 
minority that hinder this country’s path towards EU integration. We will examine these three 
areas of Turkish strategic concern in more detail in the subsequent chapters with a focus on 
Bosnia, as this is arguably the region of most active diplomatic and soft power engagement on 
behalf of Turkey. Davutoğlu importantly argues that only an active policy employing the cultural 
and historical connections of Turkey’s to the region can allow it to assume its natural role as 
protector of the Muslim minorities in these areas and become a balancing factor with regard to 
the other, international actors who are not as closely related to the region, at least not in the sense 
that Turkey is.  
We will now examine the Davutoğlu doctrine’s interesting relation with the Ottoman past 
and the resulting allegations of Neo-Ottomanism that have stimulated criticism from certain 
Balkan scholars, political analysts, and the public. I will demonstrate that the only veritable 
relation with the Ottoman past of the political doctrine of Davutoğlu is related to Turkey’s 
historical responsibility to protect Muslim minorities in the Balkans, as a natural result of the end 
of the centuries-old Ottoman Empire combined with a rather naïve perception of the latter as 
“natural allies”.96 
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Chapter Three 
Neo-Ottomanism and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans 
The pro-active orientation of Turkish foreign policy developed after the coming to power 
of AKP,
97
 is combined with the determination to discontinue the policy of rupture with the 
Ottoman past and an attempt to capitalize on its benefits in terms of historical and cultural 
connections. This has caused certain concerns among political circles and political analysts in the 
Balkans, and even among the public. A majority of the Balkan nations have mixed at best and 
very bad and even painful memories at worst with regard to the Ottoman past of their respective 
nation.
98
 Being of Bulgarian origins myself, I am aware of the crucial importance that national 
emancipation from the years of Ottoman rule and the building of a new and independent state 
have for the formation of national consciousness in this region. This is true for virtually all 
Christian Balkan states: Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania, and even for one of the 
few Muslim majority states in the region, Albania. In a sense, the end of the Ottoman Empire in 
the Balkans is seen as the real beginning of a fully emancipated national movement by these 
Balkan nations and is often times associated with the economic, educational, and political 
progress of the region.  
The new Turkish activism in the Balkans combined with a call for reevaluation of the 
country’s Ottoman past has thus been met with very mixed reactions in the Balkans and 
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sometimes with nothing short of hostility.
99
 Balkan nations remember their Ottoman past but 
usually those are not good memories. In the case of Bulgaria, March 3, the day when the San 
Stefano Peace Treaty was signed between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires in 1878, the 
equivalent of what July 4 means for America, is still celebrated as a Bulgarian National Holiday. 
In Bulgaria special emphasis in high school history instruction is placed on the atrocities 
committed by Ottoman forces after the failed April Uprising in 1876 and the infamous Massacre 
of Batak, one of the worse episodes in national history still remembered with pain.
100
 There is a 
little-known detail in this massacre that was, indeed, quite horrific in its nature. The massacres 
and horrible atrocities committed in the town of Batak in the Rhodopes were mostly perpetrated 
by irregular troops, the so-called bashi bozuks
101
, many of whom were ethnically Pomaks – 
Bulgarian Muslims. Those were people whose mother’s tongue was Bulgarian. Despite that, the 
tradition in historiography usually talks about the atrocities committed by the Turks, which, at 
least in this case, is simply not accurate. Nonetheless, while regular troops did not engage in this 
outrage, the complacency of Ottoman authorities, as well as the fact that instead of the promised 
punitive measures against the perpetrators, some of them were promoted in rank are beyond 
doubt and speak volumes of the actual state of affairs in the empire.
102
 The April Uprising 
brought international attention and eventually built up the case for war between the Russian 
Empire and Ottoman Turkey.  
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This episode clearly demonstrates why any reference to a glorious Ottoman past would 
be met with a high degree of suspicion by Christian populations in the region. Thus Serbian 
scholar of oriental history Professor Darko Tanasković argues that Turkey’s diplomatic advances 
in the region “have to be observed closely.”103 It is indicative that in the case of Bosnia only 
approximately 40 percent of the population considers Turkey to be a friendly state, a number that 
corresponds roughly to the percentage of Bosnian Muslims in the country. In the case of Serbia, 
another Balkan state that celebrates one of the most important instances of defying Ottoman 
power, the First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813) as the most important national holiday, the 
number is 15 percent, despite the significant cooperation on the political level in recent years.
104
 
The question we have therefore to answer is: does Neo-Ottomanism inform Turkish 
foreign policy strategy and diplomatic activity in the Western Balkans and what is the 
importance of the Ottoman heritage in Turkey’s new approach to the region? 
Parallel to the economic progress Turkey has made in the years of AKP rule (2002-2014), 
it has further developed a tremendous potential of academic and analytical support for its policies 
and strategic advances in foreign policy. The Turkish Foreign Ministry works closely with an 
academic think tank directly associated with and part of the government, the Center for Strategic 
Research (in Turkish SAM, Stratejik Araştırma Merkezi), which describes itself as “established 
as a consultative body to provide Turkish Foreign Policy decision makers with scholarly and 
scientific assessments of relevant issues, and reviews Turkish foreign policy with a futuristic 
perspective.”105  The foreign ministry also works with a number of similar institutions not 
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directly linked to the government but likewise informing Turkish foreign policy including: SETA 
(from Turkish Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı or Foundation for Political, 
Economic and Social Research), a powerful think tank with branches in Ankara and Washington, 
DC, and USAK (from Turkish Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu or International 
Strategic Research Organization) in addition to many others, mainly based in Ankara and 
Istanbul.  
During my one-year study in Turkey in 2012-2013 I had the chance to meet with experts 
from all three institutions and discuss some of the main aspects of Turkish engagement in the 
Western Balkans.
106
 This engagement is goal-oriented and the common goal is to build good 
neighborly relations among the nations in the region, based on tolerance, multi-culturalism, and 
economic inter-dependence. The goal of a common future in the European Union for all the 
countries in the region is clearly emphasized and the intended establishment of good and strong 
neighborly relations is clearly aimed at enhancing the countries’ European aspirations. I did 
bring up the question of the importance of the Ottoman legacy for Turkish foreign policy 
strategy. The experts who inform Turkish foreign policy decisions’ understanding is that this 
importance lies in the capability to learn from the historical lessons of this legacy.
107
 There is a 
clear tendency to approach Turkey’s relations in the region with pragmatism, with policies 
directed at concrete goals including: normalization of bilateral relations, as we will see in the 
following chapter on Turkey’s engagement in Bosnia; a goal to facilitate normalization in 
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bilateral and interethnic relations; and strong support for a common future for all the countries of 
the Western Balkans. 
I should note that the pragmatic outlook of the foreign policy analysts differs slightly in 
tone from the official doctrine of Turkish foreign policy, as expressed in Strategic Depth. 
Pragmatism is clearly present in Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s reasoning, but there is also a 
certain idealization of the Ottoman past. While the latter is not the single most important aspect 
of Davutoğlu’s strategic doctrine, I will argue that it is one of the doctrine’s weak spots. 
Idealization of the Ottoman past does carry the potential to bring counter-productive results for  
diplomatic activity in the Balkans. 
I will now go over some important points made in Strategic Depth related to the Ottoman 
heritage and cultural legacy and afterwards analyze to what extent they have influenced actual 
policies implemented in Turkey’s relations with the region.  
I already mentioned that one of Davutoğlu’s main themes in Strategic Depth is the need 
to replace the policy of complete rupture with the Ottoman past  with a policy seeking continuity 
and preservation of the cultural and historical monuments related to this past in order to 
capitalize on what he sees as instruments of influence in the region. Davutoğlu argues that there 
has been a process of gradual annihilation of “Ottoman historical heritage and Islamic culture, in 
particular in Bulgaria and Greece” to which the Turkish government has not reacted, a process 
which ultimately culminated in the attempts of complete assimilation and the expulsion of 
Bulgarian Turks in the 1990s by the Zhivkov regime.
108
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The effacement of the Ottoman legacy that Davutoğlu decries is reflected in the 
emergence of the Kemalist regime installed after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War 
I and the Turkish War of Independence.  The Kemalist regime’s extreme measures directed 
towards a complete rupture with Turkey’s Ottoman past included: assuming complete 
government control over all religious institutions, confiscation of the Ulama
109
 properties, 
rewriting national history with a special emphasis on the Turkic past that projects to the times 
Islam had not yet come to the world as an important religion.
110
 In addition to  Atatürk’s efforts 
to replace all Arabic and Persian words with words of Turkic origin, there were instances when 
the new republican government went as far as disposing of certain Ottoman archives. There is a 
famous instance when an enormous quantity of valuable archives from the Ottoman period were 
saved by sheer coincidence by Bulgarian authorities. In 1931 three train cars with paper were 
purchased for the paper plants in Kostenets and Knyazhevo. When Bulgarian authorities realized 
that the content of the said cars was mostly precious archives documenting Ottoman 
administration of Bulgaria, most of the documents were preserved and made their way into the 
State Archives.
111
 This unique collection is now available to scholars in the National Library of 
Bulgaria St. Cyril and Methodius in Sofia. The archives were bought as recycled paper at a price 
of three grosh
112
 for the oka
113
 and, had they not been purchased by Bulgaria, would have been 
destroyed.
114
 This real story demonstrates that there is some validity to Davutoğlu’s argument 
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that a complete rupture with Ottoman past is detrimental to the nation. More importantly in terms 
of the topic, he also claims that it is detrimental to Turkey’s leverage in the region. 
According to Davutoğlu, the Bosnian Crisis has demonstrated that “the connection 
between Islamic identity and Ottoman heritage and Turkish regional policies has become 
unavoidable.” According to Davutoğlu, “Every mosque destroyed, every Islamic institution that 
disappears, every Ottoman tradition that is destroyed in a cultural sense in the Balkans means 
the destruction of a base stone of Turkish cross-border influence in the region.”115 
Davutoğlu further argues that the Bosnian and Kosovo crises and the subsequent call for 
help from Turkey by the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians demonstrate that the 
protection of these two peoples can be seen as a “responsibility”116 of the new Turkish state and 
a mandatory element of its “foreign policy parameters”.117 The Muslim and Turkish minorities in 
Macedonia, Bulgaria, Sandzhak
118
, Romania, and Greece are similarly seen as elements of 
Turkish regional policies for the Balkans.
119
 Davutoğlu argues that there is a need to build a basis 
in international law for the protection of these ethnic minorities and that Turkey should strive to 
assure itself the right to intervene and protect in issues involving Muslim minorities in the 
Balkans.
120
 This can understandably be seen as a worrying tendency in Turkish policy by Balkan 
nations and even Turkey’s European allies and the US. It becomes more comprehensible, 
however when put in the context of the Bosnian War and its horrible results for the Bosnian 
Muslim population. Indeed, there have been multiple historical instances when Muslim 
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minorities in the Balkans have needed protection, starting as early as the 1860s
121
 but intensified 
with the 1877-1878 Russian-Turkish War and especially during and after the Balkan Wars of 
1912-1913.
122
  
The head of Turkish Diplomacy is aware that everything that relates to Islam and the 
Ottoman cultural heritage in regions such as Bosnia and Kosovo will be looked at with suspicion 
by the Serbs, as they have an negative opinion of the Ottoman Empire and its rule in the 
region
123
 - a perception captured in the widespread use of the phrase “Ottoman yoke.”  Balkan 
citizens may also see anything labeled “Islamic” as the work of “Islamic Fundamentalists”124. In 
this situation, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey needs to build “realistic and diplomatic means” to 
intervene and achieve its goals of protecting the local Muslims and Ottoman cultural heritage 
without agitating the local Christian populations.
125
 As we will see in Chapter Four, this goal is 
to a large extent accomplished over the course of the intense Turkish diplomatic activity in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the trilateral consultations mechanisms built between Bosnian 
authorities, Serbia, and Croatia with Turkey as a mediator. In order for this to be accomplished, 
Davutoğlu argues for the need to establish “a new balance and coordination between internal 
political culture and foreign policies” of Turkey.126 This remark obviously includes the 
reevaluation of the importance of Ottoman heritage itself, a change that started during the years 
of the late prominent Turkish politician Turgut Özal, continued during the years of the Islamic 
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Welfare Party (1996-1997)
127
 and only culminated during the years of governance by the AKP, 
the party that continues to be in power in Turkey after twelve years (2002-2014), recently 
winning local elections with a sizeable majority.
128
 Thus, the Neo-Ottomanist concepts in 
Strategic Depth are not a novelty but rather the fruit of an evolution that has taken place in 
parallel in Turkish internal politics and foreign policy agenda  since the years of Tugut Özal, first 
as Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989 and then as President of Turkey, 1989-1993.  
Turgut Özal is a rather interesting and innovative political figure and a profound study of 
his political legacy is beyond the scope of this work. However, to illustrate the point I make 
above, it would probably be sufficient to note just a couple of ideas that we can readily see 
reappear in slightly modified form in Davutoğlu’s foreign policy doctrine. In 1992 Özal wrote: 
“…The Ottoman-Muslim population shares the same historical legacy and fate as the Turks of 
Anatolia and they still regard themselves as “Turk” in the religio-cultural sense. These groups 
live in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Western Thrace.”129 
While the statement that these Muslim peoples would often be called “Turks” until the 
end of the Ottoman Empire by the Christian population is a historical fact,
130
 this was no longer 
true by the late twentieth century and, even less in the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Albanians from Macedonia or Kosovo could hardly be seen identifying themselves as Turks in 
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any sense; they would simply identify as Albanians and assign less importance to religion than 
Özal and a number of Turkish scholars and politicians would assume.
131
 
In comparison, Davutoğlu emphasizes the common cultural heritage left by the Ottoman 
Empire that binds Turkey with these peoples but limiting himself to stating the obvious truth: 
“Everyone is familiar with the historical and sincere proximity [of Turks] to Bosnians and 
Albanians.”132 Davutoğlu also consistently emphasizes in Strategic Depth the need to form 
flexible policies that would reflect current realities in order to capitalize on recent developments 
rather than seeking to reestablish the past.  Thus, we see a more realistic approach to foreign 
policy that combines the newly valued Ottoman heritage with a credible effort to engage with all 
players in the Balkans.
133
   
The challenge to any elements of Neo-Ottomanist thinking in Turkish foreign policy 
strategies is that they cannot possibly have any but negative resonance among any Christian 
nation or ethnic group in the Balkans.
134
 In addition, even some of the “natural allies”135, the 
Bosnians, Albanians
136
, or a smaller and quite unusual group such as the Gorani in Kosovo may 
not necessarily respond positively to such rhetoric. It would be useful to take briefly the example 
of the Gorani, as it is rather indicative of the cultural diversity of Muslim minorities in the 
Balkans and their complex identities. The Gorani are a relatively small ethnic minority who live 
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mainly in the South-Western part of Kosovo in the Gora region. They are a Slavic-speaking 
ethnicity whose dialect closely resembles Western Bulgarian and Pomak dialects in Thrace. 
Many of them hold Bulgarian passports although there have been systematic but unavailing 
overtures from Skopje.
137
 While they are 100% Muslim, the Gorani feel closely affiliated with 
the Bulgarians and Serbs, rather than with the Ottoman heritage, Turkey, or the neighbor 
Albanians with whom they have rather uneasy relations.
138
 Turkish scholars and politicians often 
incorrectly lump the Gorani together with the Bosnians with whom they share almost nothing 
other than the common religion.  
Davutoğlu recognizes that Turkey’s long-term strategic goal of becoming the patron of 
Muslim minorities in the Balkans is not only a “responsibility” but also “the main means of 
establishing its influence in the region.”139 Davutoğlu envisions an axis starting from Bihać-
Middle Bosnia-Eastern Bosnia-Sandžak-Kosovo-Albania-Macedonia-Kardzhali-Western Thrace 
that “in geopolitical and geo-cultural sense represents an aorta for Turkey.”140 If we look at an 
ethnographic cart of the Balkans, we can see that this imaginary axis roughly corresponds to 
areas with substantial Muslim minorities or Muslim majorities, in the cases of BiH and Kosovo.  
While this statement may initially cause understandable concerns both among Balkan 
nations, as well as among the Western allies of Turkey, it is important that Davutoğlu also states 
the goals envisioned in maintaining this axis of influence: strengthening the internal security of 
these countries, protection of cultural assets, assisting the strengthening of economic and social 
infrastructure, facilitating an increase in the communication between these societies, in other 
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words, a combination of political and soft power that is designed to increase Turkey’s influence 
in the region and preserved these ethnic groups often seen as threatened and vulnerable.  
As we will see in the subsequent chapters, the greatest challenge to Davutoğlu’s doctrine 
is dealing with the negative effects of his idealization of the Ottoman past and identification of 
Turks and Turkey with the Muslim populations in the Balkans, even though this emphasis is 
toned down as compared with Özal’s vision. This would be a challenging task, as it is 
comparable to changing the existing attitudes towards the Ottoman heritage among Christian 
peoples – stereotypes are sometimes difficult or almost impossible to change.141 At the same 
time an effort to further temper the tendencies of idealizing the Ottoman past and emphasize the 
importance of inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue could bring enormous benefits to 
Turkish foreign policy strategy in the region. 
Davutoğlu importantly does state that the way to protect the Ottoman cultural heritage 
and minority cultures in the Balkans from annihilation is through “common projects” and 
“reconciliation initiatives”. He further emphasizes the need for common efforts in lowering 
tensions in the region and seeking large economic projects that would lead to common gains 
referring to all the Balkan states and ethnic groups.
142
 He also doesn’t fail to mention the 
importance of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures like NATO and the EU of the entire 
region. This is a vision that has been confirmed by the foreign policy analysts with whom I met, 
as well as in all diplomatic initiatives of Turkey in the Western Balkans and  the rest of the larger 
Balkan region.
143
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Thus, while Neo-Ottomanism is present in Davutoğlu’s doctrine, it rather consists of a 
noticeable idealizing of the Ottoman past of the region, in addition to a tendency to overestimate 
the allegiances and strategic importance of Muslim minority groups that are quite diverse and are 
not to be lumped together for strategic purposes. These are the liabilities of the Strategic Depth 
doctrine. However, as I have shown, it also includes elements that mitigate the negative effects 
of these liabilities such as the concepts of flexibility, intense engagement in diplomatic contacts, 
and regional cooperation that point the way to more fruitful interaction with Turkey’s neighbors. 
I believe that my case studies will illustrate this point and make evident the need to further tone 
down Neo-Ottomanist rhetoric and even seek to transform it into a more encompassing initiative 
of inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue in the Balkans. Multi-culturalism in the twenty first 
century does not need to be based on Ottoman imperial past
144
 but there would likely be no harm 
done if it were to be informed by its historical lessons.  
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Chapter Four 
Engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Trilateral Consultations Mechanisms: 
Successes, Limitations, and Important Implications for the Future of the Balkans 
This chapter will attempt to present the practical aspects of two concrete diplomatic 
initiatives initiated by Turkey aimed at improving Bosnia and Herzegovina’s precarious position 
in the region, as well as good neighborly relations in the entire Western Balkans region: the 
trilateral consultations mechanisms: Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia and Turkey-Bosnia 
and Herzegovina-Croatia. The mechanisms are a product of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth 
doctrine and can be seen as its exemplar actual implementation in one of the key areas of the 
tumultuous Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina. I argue that this important diplomatic 
development for the region has to be examined in the context of the problematic situations in two 
other countries that appeared after the breakup of former Yugoslavia: Kosovo and Macedonia. 
Experience shows that crisis and conflict tend to spill across national borders in the region: the 
Kosovo status crisis has had a noticeable effect on Bosnian Serbs’ separatist tendencies, as well 
as on ethnic animosities in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The geographic 
proximity of the three young states and some cultural and religious connections that transcend 
state boundaries are among the reasons for this interdependence (see Map 4.1 below). Thus, 
Bosnia is a key country for the Balkans and successful mediation there has the potential to 
impact the entire process of Euro-Atlantic integration and security of the region across national 
borders.  
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  Map 4.1
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While hopes for successful EU integration of Turkey are fading among growing worries 
about authoritarian tendencies in the 21st century Turkish Republic, especially following the 
Gezi Protests that started in 2013, I argue that these diplomatic initiatives clearly demonstrate the 
immense strategic importance of Turkey as a US ally and partner, and prospective member of the 
EU. Through the trilateral consultations mechanisms, an original initiative of Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
Turkey demonstrates that it is uniquely positioned to facilitate dialogue in the Balkans and to 
contribute to the establishment of sustainable peace and economic development and more 
harmonious relations between the ethnicities living in these areas.  
Because of the recent character of the developments I am going to examine, my narrative 
is based to a large extent on official government documents, mostly originating from the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry and the Turkish Presidency, video and audio materials presenting the 
consultations, more recent scholarly articles, in addition to political analyses by some of the 
prominent foreign policy experts from the various think tanks who provide formidable support 
and academic backing to Turkish foreign policy actors. I will also be drawing on my personal 
encounters and conversations with such experts who work closely with the Turkish government 
in Ankara.
146
   
I believe that Davutoğlu’s work lays out a number of ambitious tasks for Turkish 
involvement in the Balkans and in particular in what he calls “points of conflict”147 left after the 
demise of the Ottoman Empire. These “points of conflict” include three present states: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Among them, Bosnia occupies a key strategic 
position in Turkish foreign policy, as it is seen as an “economic and cultural outpost of Turkey in 
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Central Europe.”148 I will first examine in more detail Turkey’s diplomatic engagement in 
Bosnia, as it is accordingly significantly more intense than in the other two smaller states of 
Kosovo and Macedonia. There are several additional factors that make Turkish engagement in 
Bosnia more significant: it represents a successful engagement in post-conflict mediation; it 
shows the pragmatic face of Turkish diplomacy and its potential to play a positive role in 
bringing about new and better relations between the Balkan ethnicities; Turkey’s attempt to 
facilitate reconciliation and good neighborly relations in Bosnia arguably seeks to redress some 
of the past failures of European and US diplomacy in this region, creating a positive trend in 
interethnic and international relations in the larger Balkan region. 
In his speech addressing the Conference on the Ottoman Legacy and the Balkan Muslim 
Communities Today in Sarajevo in October, 2009 — on the eve of the start of the mediation 
mechanisms we are going to look at — Foreign Minister Davutoğlu calls Bosnia a “miniature of 
the Balkans”.149 It is a land where Bosnians and other Muslims, Serbs, Croats, and Jews have 
lived together for centuries.  
Bosnia’s capital city of Sarajevo, indeed, used to be one of the best examples for multi-
cultural co-existence in the Balkans. Unfortunately, there has been a long Balkan tradition of 
marring the multi-cultural heritage of Ottoman cities: what scholar of the Balkans and the 
Ottoman Empire Edin Hajdarpašić calls “the radical ‘un-mixing’ of the populations in the former 
imperial realms”150 affected all corners of the former Ottoman domains. The examples of Skopje, 
Thessaloniki, Istanbul, and Smyrna or Izmir come to mind among the more famous ones. 
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Sarajevo was one of the last to suffer this fate during the Bosnian war in the years 1992-1995.
151
 
It is difficult to imagine that only ten years prior to these horrible times the city had hosted the 
1984 Sarajevo Winter Olympics. 
Despite the horrific interethnic violence of the years of the Bosnian War in 1992-1995, 
prominent Bosnian public figure and scholar Rusmir Mahmutćehajić characterizes Bosnia as a 
land marked not by violence but rather by “resistance to violence in the name of the fraternity of 
the Abrahamic religions in a community of difference.”152 The strategic geopolitical location of 
Bosnia suggests frequent international conflicts and its essentially multi-ethnic character 
throughout history has often been challenged by imperial rivalries and the rapid rise of 
nationalism in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries.
153
 The formation of Yugoslavia as the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 gave significant leverage to the Serbian element in the new 
state that does not recognize any Bosnian identity and, similarly to its heir, the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, prefers to lump Bosnians together with any citizen of Yugoslavia that 
happens to be of the Islamic denomination as “Muslims”.154 Despite this, the national ideology of 
the Bosnian Muslims started to take a definite shape towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
intensifying in the twentieth, especially in 1960s and 1970s Yugoslavia.
155
  
The self-identification Bosnian so far remains almost limited to the cultural and historical 
identity of Bosnian Muslims, a European people which is rooted in Ottoman and Islamic culture. 
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This rather curious cultural identity is exemplified by the late Bosnian politician, scholar and 
intellectual Alija Izetbegović.156 Bosnian Serbs and Croats tend to identify as, respectively, Serbs 
or Croats before the category “Bosnian” is even mentioned which creates an additional challenge 
to state building in Bosnia. While the prospect for militarized ethnic conflict seems remote at the 
moment, Bosnia remains an unstable political entity suffering from a political and institutional 
impasse that has lasted for years after the Dayton Agreement. 
One relatively wide-spread assessment of the Dayton Peace Agreement is, as former 
High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown puts it, that it was “a superb 
agreement to end a war, but a very bad agreement to make a state.”157 Indeed, it appears that 
Bosnian politicians from the three different constituent peoples have consistently failed to 
establish mechanisms to work together. There continue to exist strong separatist tendencies 
coming from two out of three of them: the Bosnian Serbs and, to a lesser extent, the Croatians.  
While all the sources I have consulted seem to validate the second part of  this statement, 
I will present two points and leave it to the reader to decide whether Dayton can be seen as a 
“superb agreement to end the war”.158  
Map 4.2 below shows the Bosnian ethnicities prior to the 1992-1995 conflict. It is very 
clear that such a distribution makes the division along ethnic lines impossible. Map 4.3 shows 
Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, the autonomous entity controlled entirely by the Bosnian 
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Serbs. The military campaigns of the Bosnian Serbs were specifically aimed at altering the pre-
war ethnic balance and did not shy away from methods such as ethnic cleansing and even 
genocide in the case of Srebrenica. If we look at Map 4.3 below, I believe that it becomes clear 
that the Dayton Peace Accord, as a diplomatic settlement clearly sanctions the ethnic cleansing 
and genocide that had been carried by Bosnian Serb troops in the course of the war. As Lord 
David Owen notes, this may be seen, while not a desirable outcome by any means, the only 
possible outcome of a civil war.
159
 
The second point I would like to make is that the agreement came after three years of 
bloody conflict that left over 100,000 people dead between 1992 and 1993.
160
 The slow reaction 
of the international community (the UN, the leading Western European countries, most notably 
Great Britain, and the United States) is characterized by Former Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Holbrooke as “the great collective failure of the West, the greatest one, in my view, 
since the late 1930s”.161 
In addition to the strange and unnatural shape of the two entities of Republika Srpska and 
the Federation, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country of aproximately four million population has 
three presidents, one representing each “constituent people”: Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs. There 
is also a rather intricate cantonal structure providing for a large degree of local autonomy, as 
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Map 4.2. Ethnic Map of Bosnia According to the 1991 Census
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Map 4.3. Dayton Peace Agreement Partition of Bosnia
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each canton is entitled to a cantonal government. Finally, this institutional structure provides for 
more than 150 ministers and 14 constitutions in force.
164
 For a region that traditionally 
experiences problems with administration capacities such as the Balkans, in addition to the 
looming ethnic animosities that are still present, this provides for a formidable institutional 
deadlock and a lot of incentives for corruption practices, the main reason behind recent mass 
protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
165
  
After Dayton, relations between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one 
side and Republika Srpska and neighboring Serbia on the other had been uneasy at best and 
marked by a complete lack of trust. Indeed, before the start of the trilateral consultations 
mechanism Bosnia and Herzegovina and its neighbor Serbia had no official diplomatic relations, 
and contacts between the two countries were limited to visits by the Bosnian Serb leadership of 
Republika Srpska to Belgrade. 
I believe that it is clear why in this context, Turkey was rightfully concerned that bad 
relations of Bosnia with its neighbors leave its Bosniak majority politically and economically 
isolated. At the same time, only one year prior to the beginning of the trilateral meetings 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 had strained Serbian-Turkish 
relations  bringing them to almost a complete halt.
166
 This was rightfully perceived as an 
abnormal situation but also as an opportunity for Turkey and a time to act. Davutoğlu’s 
ambitions to adopt a more active Balkan policy became clear shortly after he assumed office in 
2009, as he embarked on official visits to Serbia and Montenegro.  However, through the 
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establishment of the trilateral consultations mechanism Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia, 
he demonstrated Ankara’s will to play henceforth an active and important role as a mediator 
wielding enough power to motivate the two other parties to make substantial progress in 
improving bilateral relations, with the ultimate goal of EU integration in mind for all the 
participants in the mechanism. This common goal continues to be a source of motivation 
today.
167
  
It is noteworthy that Turkey had been interested in participating as a moderator in the US 
and EU-sponsored Butmir talks that started shortly prior to the trilateral consultations but Turkey 
was not invited. Thus Foreign Minister Davutoğlu decided to embark on an initiative of his own 
that would involve the key actors who had the potential to contribute to a more stable Bosnia 
and, subsequently, more stable Balkans. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s previously mentioned 
address to the Ottoman Legacy conference invoked a common Ottoman legacy and made some 
controversial statements. On the one hand, Davutoğlu confirmed Turkey’s desire to lead the 
region into initiatives aimed at increased regional cooperation: “As the Republic of Turkey, we 
would like to construct a new Balkan region based on political dialogue, economic 
interdependence, cooperation and integration, as well as cultural harmony and tolerance.”168  
This statement sums up Turkey’s new multifaceted foreign policy strategy and the realistic and 
pragmatic concepts that were to be applied in the upcoming diplomatic initiative. 
On the other hand, some of the other messages given in his speech are very good 
examples of why many scholars, political analysts, and journalists in the region accuse Turkey of 
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having a hidden Neo-Ottoman political agenda.
169
 For instance, Davutoğlu ventures to claim 
that: “…between the 16th and the 19th centuries, Balkan history was a success story. We can 
reinvent and reestablish this success by creating a new political ownership, a new multicultural 
coexistence and a new economic zone.”170 
While the sixteenth century was marked by the reign of some of the strongest rulers of the 
Ottoman Empire, including Süleyman the Magnificent, it would be hard for any historian to 
claim that the nineteenth century history of either Ottoman rule on the Balkans or the 
developments in the region can be characterized as a “success story”. The nineteenth century was 
turbulent times for the region which saw, among many other calamities the unsuccessful attempt 
by Sultan Selim III to reform the Empire’s army by diminishing the role and influence of the 
Janissary corps that ended in the Sultan’s brutal assassination by the latter.171 In 1878 the Empire 
lost a lot of territory to the new Bulgarian state, Serbia, and Montenegro. Even from the 
perspective of Balkan states, there were no notable successes achieved. Davutoğlu’s words here 
represent an emotional appeal to a Balkan Muslim audience, invoking the tendency to idealize 
the Ottoman past that was already noted in the previous chapter. The speech is obviously aiming 
to incite a pride in the Balkan historical heritage as an important part of Ottoman Empire. The 
downside of this approach, especially when the speech is given in a multi-ethnic country such as 
BiH
172
 is that rhetoric specifically targeted at the Muslim audience and invoking the centuries of 
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Ottoman rule is guaranteed to have negative effects among the former Christian subjects of the 
empire. This idealized view of Ottoman heritage is by no means something unique to Foreign 
Minister Davutoğlu as a scholar and a politician. It is my impression that he holds a rather wide-
spread view that may be tied to conditioning originating in the years of secondary education.  
This is a problem rather common for the Balkan region: an idealized past that leaves no room for 
error when it comes to one’s own government, and Turkey makes no exception.173 
Parallel with the tendency to exaggerate and idealize the successes of Ottoman rule, 
among Balkan scholars there is a tendency to exaggerate the downsides of Ottoman rule and 
downplay some of its positive legacies including the multi-culturalism of cities like 
Thessaloniki,
174
 Prizren, and Smyrna (Izmir) which clearly sets the stage for conflicting 
narratives and ultimately impasse in regional relations.
175
 There has to be a process on both sides 
towards reconciliation with this contested past in order to utilize it as a basis for current 
interaction.   
Towards the end of his address Davutoğlu sends a message of Turkey’s unconditional 
support for Muslim communities from the Balkans or the Caucasus saying that Turkey is their 
“safe haven and homeland”. His next words bring a message that also has the potential to do 
harm to the imminent diplomatic initiative that we are about to discuss: “You are most welcome 
as well, because Anatolia belongs to you; and make sure that Sarajevo is ours.”176 
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While Davutoğlu clearly means here that Muslims should feel at home in Turkey, the 
same way that Turks feel at home in Sarajevo, for anyone familiar with the region it would not 
be hard to understand why this would sound an alarm in the mind of any of the former Christian 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire: Serb, Bulgarian, or Greek. It is precisely this sort of statements 
that fuel the divisive rhetoric of nationalistic leaders like Bosnian Serb politician Milorad 
Dodik.
177
 We will see how later similar naïve emotional rhetoric from Prime Minister Erdoğan 
would put at hazard Turkish diplomatic openings in the region altogether in 2013. 
At the same time, Davutoğlu gives some clear messages of Ankara’s intent to promote 
dialogue and understanding in the region and some of the most important positivistic aspects of 
Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine: a multi-faceted approach to foreign policy, a call for 
dialogue, and the ambition of Turkey to lead these openings as an economically powerful actor 
with newly acquired political self-esteem: “The Turkish perspective in the region is to 
reestablish a new regional order based on the understanding of a political dialogue, solving 
problems through dialogue, intensive economic relations and cultural coexistence and 
harmony.”178 
Perhaps the most important point made by Davutoğlu is that only regional activism, 
initiatives born and carried within the region, would unite the nations of the Balkans. The 
Turkish Foreign Minister rightfully notes that the region has become a geo-political buffer 
zone.
179
 With the First and Second World Wars in mind and the ensuing Cold War division of 
the region, it is easy to see that this is a very valid point. Being of Balkan origins myself, I am 
aware that Balkan nations have consistently had the feeling that their fate does not depend on 
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themselves but rather on their geographic location and the mercy of the Great Powers. Instead, 
Davutoğlu argues for the creation of a “new sense of unity” saying: “We have to strengthen 
regional ownership of cooperation initiatives and a regional common sense.”180 
This last point represents in a nutshell the main idea and strategic means at the base of Turkey’s 
imminent serious diplomatic engagement in Bosnia, the Trilateral Consultations Mechanisms 
Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia and Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia. 
 
Important Meetings and Decisions 
The foundations for the trilateral mechanism were laid during the Southeast European 
Cooperative Initiative summit in Istanbul as an informal meeting between the foreign ministers 
of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sven Alkalaj, and Vuk Jeremić for 
Serbia. Despite the unofficial character of the meeting the three parties importantly agreed, in 
Mr. Davutoğlu’s words, that “no matter what differences of view appear between the sides, they 
would continue to meet each month.”181  The first meeting in trilateral format was strengthened 
by President Gül’s official visit to Belgrade in late October of 2009. This was importantly the 
first official visit on such level since 1986, signaling a warming of bilateral relations that would 
help in the ensuing intensification of the trilateral consultations. 
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  The second meeting followed in November 8 again in Istanbul, shortly after it became 
clear that the Butmir talks, a joint EU and US initiative, were leading nowhere
182
. The third 
meeting was  in Sarajevo in December 13-14, 2009. 
  Even if we put aside any results achieved at this initial stage, I believe that the very idea 
of regular meetings aimed at finding solutions to the problems and the obvious will and 
determination of all sides to participate in such an initiative is quite significant. I would argue 
that this is part of a process of normalization in terms of Turkey’s role in Balkan affairs and part 
of a quest for normalization of its relations with all Balkan neighbors. Turkey’s increased 
economic power during the first seven years of AKP rule called for a revision of foreign policy 
as it placed it in a position to influence events and seek regional leadership.
183
 It can also be seen 
as part of a general trend towards normalization in international relations in the region, a 
normalization, in which Turkey as a bigger and economically more powerful country occupies a 
very natural place.
184
  
The fourth trilateral meeting took place in Belgrade on January 15. In addition to the 
commitment to the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
Serbian President Boris Tadić, this meeting began to bring concrete economic results for the 
Serbian side: Turkey and Serbia agreed to initiate important highway projects in Serbia, 
infrastructure projects in the Muslim majority area Sandžak, in addition to a cooperation 
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agreement between Turkish Airways and JAT, as well as a decision to open an Islamic Cultural 
Center in Belgrade.
185
   
The fifth official meeting took place in Ankara on February 9, 2010. I will examine this 
particular meeting in more detail, perhaps the most emblematic of all, as it is the one that offers 
brings to the first serious advances in Bosnian-Serbian dialogue. In addition, the three foreign 
ministers offer their common vision for the future of the region in a spirit of true friendship and 
openness. After their meetings and decisions, Foreign Ministers Davutoğlu for Turkey, Vuk 
Jeremić for Serbia, and Sven Alkalaj for Bosnia and Herzegovina gave a joint press conference 
in Turkish and partly in English.
186
 
In Minister Davutoğlu’s words, the goals of the mechanism were to share the common 
regional vision (for the Balkan region), to turn the Balkans from a region of conflicts and tension 
to a region of cooperation where problems are solved through negotiations and diplomacy, and 
eventually establish this as a new image of the Balkans, one that highlights “understanding”, 
“open-mindedness” and a common “vision” for the region. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu opens 
the conference addressing his “dear friends” from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.187         
This spirit of friendship is quite important in the context of the Balkans, especially with 
the gruesome war in Bosnia in the recent past in mind. There is a very Balkan concept of 
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komşu,188 which transcends national borders and brings up the good side of Ottoman heritage. In 
Turkish the word means “neighbor”. The tradition is to have open and good relations with your 
neighbor no matter what. The good will expressed by an economically powerful neighbor, as this 
initiative shows, has the potential to mobilize Balkan peoples to work together for a better future 
in the region. Davutoğlu underlined that in the last five months, the three foreign ministers have 
been able to establish a “very good cooperation mechanism” that started on October 10, 2009. 
Davutoğlu described the mechanism as aimed at improving relations in the entire larger region, 
the relations between the three respective countries, and, most of all, relations between BiH and 
Serbia.
189
 What has to be noted here is that, in addition to the obvious benefits of regular 
diplomatic exchanges and economic cooperation between Serbia and Bosnia that did not exist 
prior to the consultation mechanism, as there were no official diplomatic relations, Serbia has a 
considerable influence over the second most important constituent people in Bosnia, the Bosnian 
Serbs. Belgrade’s support for Bosnia as a state is thus seen by Turkey as crucial for the 
establishment of normal interethnic relations within Bosnia. 
Davutoğlu emphasized the common historical heritage and common geography of the 
three nations and the need to take the initiative and transform the region’s image from one 
characterized by “conflict and division” to a region where outstanding issues are solved by 
“cooperation, consultation, and where problems are solved through diplomatic means.” The 
Turkish Foreign Minister expresses his content with the “understanding, open-mindedness, and 
vision” demonstrated by his Bosnian and Serbian colleagues, characterizing this as a “new and 
positive development for the region.” Mentioning the lack of communication between Sarajevo 
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and Belgrade that had lasted for three years, Davutoğlu heralds the embassy of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina soon to open in Belgrade as a psychological threshold that has been passed, and that 
would provide ground for normalization and development of the relations between the two 
countries.
190
  
Davutoğlu pledges to continue the meetings with a meeting in Sarajevo in March and in 
Belgrade in April which he sees as the best way to deal with prejudices and continue this positive 
trend in regional relations: “Our region, which is perceived to always have the potential for crises 
needs badly this kind of news.”191 Turkey is very pleased with this result because, in 
Davutoğlu’s words: “we see every friendship in the Balkans as a step towards a brighter 
future.”192 
Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj overall confirms the main messages of Foreign Minister 
Davutoğlu’s opening remarks but also importantly states that this initiative is seen as part of the 
aspirations of all three countries for full membership into the European Union.
193
 Indeed, this 
remains one of the most important incentives for the participants from the very beginning of the 
initiative until the last meeting in 2013. 
Foreign Minister Jeremić of Serbia starts his remarks with thanks for the host's “warm 
hospitality” saying that it is “a pleasure to be back and talk to friends.”194 While these remarks 
may seem insignificant at first, they are ultimately quite important. In addition to its economic 
power and capabilities to invest and foster economic cooperation in the region, Turkey is a 
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country known for its hospitality which additionally positions it as capable of successfully 
organizing such initiatives of good will. 
Jeremić additionaly affirms that the consultations mechanism has proven to be “the most 
resilient form of reginal cooperation” and that it is important to “continue this trend.” He also 
importantly states that all participants in the mechanism are committed to a regional future of 
positive relations between all Balkan countries. He states the awareness that, due to the recent 
memories and the different views on certain matters, this will be a rather challenging task to 
achieve. However, Jeremić expresses his belief that the standing issues have to be overcome for 
the sake of “a more prosperous future for the Western Balkans.” Jeremić is notably more 
reserved on the prospects of the initiative but, at the same time, expresses his firm will to 
struggle until the end affirming that giving up is not an option. Similar to his colleagues from 
Bosnia and Turkey, he states that all participants are proud of their “Balkan” identity and will 
strive for a “European” future of the Balkans, a region where they all believe the Balkan 
countries belong.
195
 This is a very important point that was confirmed in my meetings with 
foreign policy analysts in Ankara think tanks, people who inform Turkish foreign policy 
decisions.
196
  
Despite the naive idealizing of the Ottoman past that may slip in addresses like the one I 
commented on earlier, in terms of practical foreign policy purposes, Turkey has a European 
agenda for the Western Balkans regions.
197
 Turkey wants to see the Balkan states united under 
the umbrella of the EU, as this is the best guarantee for stability and economic development, the 
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security of the region, as well as the protection of the human rights of all minorities, including 
the already mentioned Muslim ethnicities.
198
 This can hardly be seen as a Neo-Ottoman agenda 
and Turkey's concrete initiatives reflect this concept rather than anything even closely 
resembling ambitions to revive the late Ottoman Empire. 
The challenge here is to gradually neutralize historical rhetoric that may be seen as 
controversial and problematic and, instead, seek a dialogue on this matter as well, similarly to 
what Turkey has proven it has the will and the capability to achieve at the negotiations table in 
this extremely positive initiative.
199
 
The first significant and concrete result of the trilateral consultations mechanism was the 
decision to end the freeze in Bosnian-Serbian relations through the appointment of an 
ambassador of BiH to Belgrade.
200
 Perhaps the second most important development that took 
place shortly after the meeting, on March 30, 2010 when the Serbian Parliament adopted a 
resolution condemning the Srebrenica Massacre, a decision facilitated by Turkish mediation.
201
 
Paralel with the Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia consultations mechanism, 
Turkish diplomacy organized a mechanism in the same format with the Croatian side: Turkey-
Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia, again on the level of foreign ministers. Turkish-Croatian 
relations had been quite good and the two countries even saw each-other as strategic partners in a 
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common path to the European Union. In 2009 there was already a well-established mutual 
support for each country's bid for EU membership.
202
 
Thus, the trilateral consultations mechanism Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia 
came as a logical continuation to already cordial bilateral relations. The initiative has a very 
similar agenda to its counterpart
203
 as Turkey engages in a mediation effort to settle any 
outstanding issues between BiH and Croatia and facilitate the improvement of relations between 
the two respective ethnicities. Croatians are the third constituent people of BiH and hold majority 
in a number of municipalities, the most known being Mostar.
204
 In 2010 alone four trilateral 
meetings took place between foreign ministers Ahmet Davutoğlu, Sven Alkalaj, and Gordan 
Jandroković. Some of the most important points on the agenda are: important restoration projects 
in Mostar, intensification of cooperation in the field of tourism, and construction projects. This 
consultation mechanism is marked by lower intensity, partly because of the smaller amount of 
outstanding issues between Croatia and Bosnia and also additionally lost intensity after 2010.  
In the months following the February meeting of the Turkey-Bosnia and Herzegovina-
Serbia meeting on foreign ministry level, the consultation mechanism was upgraded to the level 
of summit meetings. On April 24, 2010 the Istanbul Summit brought together the Heads of State 
of BiH, Serbia, and Turkey. The most important result from the meeting was the adoption of the 
Istanbul Declaration, the main provisions of which were: the mutual commitment to strive for 
lasting peace and stability in the Balkans, and the protection of  the territorial integrity of Bosnia 
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and Herzegovina.
205
 The decision was taken for joint participation of President Boris Tadić and 
Prime Minister Erdoğan in the commemoration ceremony of the 15th year of the Srebrenica 
Massacre, carried out in July 2010.
206
  
The April 2010 Istanbul Summit was the first official meeting on the presidential level 
between Serbia and Bosnia. In addition, President of Bosnia Silajdžić stated his intent to soon 
visit Belgrade with members of the presidency, an event characterized as historic.
207
 While this 
qualification may seem exaggerated at first, we have to remember the context here. The Bosnian 
War had ended only some fifteen years prior to this summit and President Sijadžić is a politician 
with nationalistic inclinations and a tendency to utter rather strong words. Only days prior to the 
summit, he had qualified Serbia as “a country spoiling regional relations” after the arrest of Eyup 
Ganić, participant in the war on the side of the Bosnian Army.208 
Despite the intention to organize such summit meetings three times every two years, in 
reality a different formula took place as two more Balkan Summits took place in the subsequent 
three years. The second Balkan Summit took place in April, 2011 in Karađorđevo, Serbia. The 
organizer, President of Serbia Boris Tadić was criticized for the choice of the place, as 
Karađorđevo's legacy was rather negative. It is precisely there that late Serbian leader Slobodan 
Milošević had met with his Croatian colleague to discuss the partition of Bosnia in 1991. 
President Tadić admitted that Karađorđevo is, indeed, a place where “some good and some hard 
and pretty bad decisions were taken” during the Yugoslav years, decisions that “resulted in 
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negative consequences and bad experience for everyone”.209 But he goes on to say: “It is our 
intention to do everything to set things right in the future with our hard and complex past in 
mind.” Tadić stressed that despite the recent positive trends in the region, “not all wounds have 
healed.”210  
The important accents in the summit are: cooperation and support in the common EU 
accession efforts between all participants in the mechanism, condemnation of war crimes and a 
commitment to cooperate for the punishment of everyone involved in them, overcoming the 
legacy of the past and building new and peaceful Balkans based on mutual respect and 
cooperation.
211
 
The Third Trilateral Balkan Summit took place in Ankara on May 14 and 15, 2013 
bringing together all three Members of the Bosnian Presidency: Željko Komšić, Bakir 
Izetbegović, and Nebojša Radmanović, President of Turkey Abdullah Gül and Serbian President 
Tomislav Nikolić.212 The accents of the summit organized under the motto “Building Future 
Together” are: transition from reconciliation to institutionalization of the process, strengthening 
of economic cooperation with the adoption of the Declaration on Economic and Commercial 
Cooperation adopted at the summit and the establishment of a Trilateral Trade Committee; the 
commitment to support each-other on the path of EU integration is confirmed and underlined 
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together with the appeal to develop trilateral cooperation in various fields including: culture, 
common historical heritage, education, military and security cooperation.
213
 
The last trilateral consultations meeting on foreign ministers level between Turkey, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia took place in September 24, 2013 in New York, focusing on 
concrete projects of future cooperation in the field of education and business. The organization 
of a Trilateral Business Forum in Sarajevo in the near future was discussed.
214
 
 
Limitations 
Recent mass protests in Bosnia suggest that there is an acute need for the reform of  
BiH’s political structures. While the trilateral consultations cannot solve the Dayton impasse, 
they could be instrumental in fostering an initiative to deal with this issue. A solution of the 
current political and administrative crisis in Bosnia would take an effort by all the sides who 
participated in Dayton. This said, it would be reasonable to argue that Turkey’s mediation 
initiatives can be quite helpful as they can prepare the ground for it and this was one of the main 
goals of the initiative from its very start in October, 2009.
215
 
Another important limitation is the fact that the initiative’s results cannot reach fruition 
until Turkey makes a credible effort to reach out to the third constituent people of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serbs. There are positive signs in that direction, as FM Davutoğlu 
during a recent visit to Sarajevo has expressed his will to reach out to all sides as a necessary 
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condition to find a solution to the crisis in Bosnia
216
 but a lot remains to be achieved in this 
respect.
217
 
There have been continuing concerns that the economic cooperation between the three 
sides is lagging behind the political will and way short of reaching its full potential, given the 
dynamic growth of the Turkish economy in recent years.
218
 For instance, Turkish investment in 
Bosnia totaled 623 million dollars in 2011 and only increased to 632 million in 2012.
219
 Turkish 
investors have expressed concerns with the relatively complicated regulations and bureaucracy in 
addition to financial insecurity that hinders investment in Bosnia. There is a consciousness 
among Bosnian officials that the climate for investment needs to improve in order for Turkish 
investment to achieve its full potential.
220
 
At the same time, some of the limitations of Turkey’s engagement in the Balkans are self-
inflicted. I already discussed a certain tone deafness with regard to the importance the Ottoman 
heritage carries for the different ethnicities living in this region. The following event 
demonstrates that sensitivity to the conflicting feelings and perceptions of the past and of cultural 
spaces of each Balkan country and ethnicity have to be taken into account in order to 
successfully achieve Turkey’s strategic goals in the region. 
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Erdoğan’s Faux Pas 
At a rally in Kosovo in October 2013 Prime Minister Erdoğan was addressing an 
audience of Kosovar Albanians and talking about the common history and shared culture by 
Turks and Albanians when he uttered the phrase: “Do not forget: Turkey is Kosovo and Kosovo 
is Turkey!”221 While he was not referring to the territorial integrity of either country, this was 
immediately followed by mass demonstrations and a huge diplomatic scandal in Serbia. Part of 
the repercussions was President Nikolić’s statement that he is withdrawing from the trilateral 
summits until he receives an apology for the incident. This was hardly a surprise. One analyst 
argues that Erdoğan’s words twisted “the knife in the heart of Serbian national identity” in the 
center of which is precisely Kosovo, the theater of the famous war between the Ottomans and 
Serbs in 1389.
222
 Erdoğan’s words as he addressed the Kosovar Albanians in Prizren, one of the 
former multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religion city urban centers of the Ottoman Empire 
I mentioned above, were aimed at reassuring the local population but instead caused the 
cancellation of the Trilateral Summit Meeting scheduled for December 2013. 
This recent incident shows us that Turkey has yet to recognize the counter-productiveness 
of invoking an idealized Ottoman past — a version of the past that cannot serve as the intended 
bridge between the Balkan ethnicities.  The misstep occurred despite the fact that Turkish 
politicians had received timely warnings about this problem by some of Ankara’s many capable 
foreign policy analysts like Erhan Türbedar who addresses this issue at length in his article 
“Turkey’s New Activism in the Western Balkans: Ambitions and Obstacles”  written in 2011.223 
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Türbedar prophetically assesses that the way Ankara and Belgrade deal with “future 
developments in Kosovo” will represent the “true test of the two countries” rapprochement.224 
One of the main goals of the trilateral consultations mechanisms was to build confidence among 
the three sides.
225
 The damage done by Erdoğan’s Kosovo speech is yet to be assessed and the 
lack of an official apology is the cause for a continuing stalemate in this very positive Turkish 
initiative. 
There have been voices of reason calling for the renewal of the process, most notably 
coming from prominent politicians like the former President of Serbia, Boris Tadić who recently 
gave an extended interview underlining the substantial benefits for both sides and the previous 
successes like the trilateral consultations mechanisms.
226
 Tadić underlines that Erdoğan’s 
statement should be taken for what it is, namely a “diplomatic gaffe” and shouldn’t be given 
more importance than it deserves. He also stresses the vulnerability of countries like Bosnia and 
Macedonia and the negative effects that present stagnation in EU integration processes can have 
for these former Yugoslav states.
227
  
While certain Neo-Ottomanist tendencies are present in Turkish foreign policy strategy, 
as we saw when examining Davutoğlu’s work Strategic Depth, I think that it is safe to say that 
Turkish engagement in Bosnia is dictated by the desire to achieve the integration of the entire 
region of the Western Balkans in the Euro-Atlantic organizations: the EU and NATO. It is a 
point underlined by Tadić in the cited interview, as well as the participants in virtually all 
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trilateral meetings. It is a very positive initiative that deserves the encouragement of Turkey’s 
western allies: the EU and the US. Turkey’s openings in this region have occasionally been 
looked upon with suspicion
228
 but the reality is that in substantive terms its diplomacy follows a 
pragmatic, goal-oriented approach aimed at the well-being of all ethnicities in the Balkans and 
regional cooperation between all Balkan states. The priority given to Muslim ethnic groups is 
understandable with regard to the country’s strong cultural, historical, and social ties with these 
populations.
229
 In fact, these strong ties make it an important potential force in any initiatives 
aimed at improving the often tense relations between the different ethnicities in Bosnia, as well 
as in the rest of the region, including Kosovo and Macedonia. Another proof for this potential is 
Turkey’s assistance in mediation with two opposing factions of Bosnian Muslims in the Sandžak 
Region in Serbia in 2010. Turkey managed to convince the two sides to seek a consensus figure, 
efforts that ended successfully in the same year. Turkey’s help had been solicited by Serbian 
authorities.
230
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
228
 See Türbedar 2011, 153. 
229
 Most of these groups like the Kosovar Albanians or the Bosnians have quite large communities in Turkey proper 
who are at times able to influence politics within Turkey. 
230
 See Bechev 2012, 141. 
70 
 
Chapter Five 
Turkish Engagement in Kosovo and Macedonia. Turkish Soft Power 
According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Balkans remain “Europe’s 
most fragile region.”231 This is true not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for the other 
two multi-ethnic states mentioned in Strategic Depth that appeared as independent states after 
the demise of Yugoslavia: Kosovo and Macedonia. 
We already metioned earlier the notion of “points of conflict”232 referring to territories 
that appeared after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, leaving their Muslim and other non-Serbian 
populations including Bulgarians and Albanians vulnerable to the new authorities’ repressive 
measures. It is important to note that mass repressions in these regions go way back in history. 
They were initiated by the Serbian government over the course of the First and Second Balkan 
Wars (1912-1913) and continued after the end of World War I causing the mass flight of masses 
of Muslim Albanians, Bosnians, and Turks to Anatolia.
233
 The reasoning behind the need to 
protect and assist these populations, in particular all the Muslim ethnicities who, according to 
Davutoğlu have very strong ties with their former “political center”234 suggests that Kosovo 
would have the same kind of priority as Bosnia in terms of an absolute commitment to help its 
population and the new and vulnerable state that formed after the Kosovo War in 1998-1998 and 
only recently announced its independence in 2008.
235
 However, one substantial difference with 
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Bosnia is that Turkey has only engaged diplomatically on a limited scale in Kosovo, mostly 
lobbying for its international recognition and participation in important meetings related to 
international and regional cooperation.
236
  
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan has offered Turkey’s services as mediator between the 
authorities in Prishtina and Belgrade but it seems that the offer has not been accepted by either 
one.
237
 As we have seen in recent years, the task has been taken up by the EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. The EU mediation 
initiative has proven to be largely successful as the EU has a more powerful tool that Ankara 
cannot possibly match, the pre-accession conditionality, something that has proven quite 
effective in the past in inducing Serbian compliance with the ICTFY. 
Ankara knows its limitations and has instead embarked on the complex use of its multi-
faceted or “multidimensional” foreign policy. The effects in modern Kosovo are very visible. A 
modern highway is being built by Turkish-US joint venture connecting the capitals of Kosovo 
and Albania: Prishtina and Tirana.
238
 It is indicative that the segment Prishtina-Prizren is already 
completed which brings me to my next point. 
In Strategic Depth Davutoğlu argues that there is a specific axis formed by Kosovo where 
“three rings cross”: the first one is formed by Kosovo (or Kosovo+Serbia), Albania, and 
Macedonia. According to Davutoğlu, due to the division of the Albanian ethnic element there, 
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there tend to be “significant tensions” in this region. 239 This is a reasonable point, as ethnic 
tensions in the region have proven to jump easily across the border and this is particularly true in 
the case of the Kosovo-Macedonia border, a spillover so dangerous that in 2001 the Macedonian 
government saw itself forced to seek help from NATO to handle the volatile situation across the 
borderline and require EU and US mediation.
240
 
The second ring is larger and it is formed by Greece, Yugoslavia,
241
 Bulgaria, Turkey, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
242
 all countries that could be directly affected by a spread of crisis 
and capable to intervene directly.
243
 The third ring includes the countries who are capable to 
influence the two other smaller rings and includes: Croatia (capable to intervene in Bosnia), 
Hungary (capable to intervene in Vojvodina
244),  and Romania who “due to its geographic 
location is capable to influence the balance in all these relations.”245 According to Davutoğlu, 
Turkey needs to develop its diplomacy in accordance with these three rings’ interactions. He also 
stresses the crucial importance of strengthening the Albanian element in the first ring (formed of 
Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania) “in any way possible” obviously referring to economic and 
other assistance, citing an example with Turkey’s failure to assist Albania in a banking crisis that 
has led to assistance from Greece, thus practically increasing its leverage in the region.
246
 
Thus, we can already see a policy that has the potential to aggravate both the 
Macedonians and the Serbs, ethnicities that both border with the Albanian ethnicity in the region. 
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Similarly to the Neo-Ottomanism rhetoric, such policies have the potential to immediately 
alienate nations or ethnicities that may otherwise be willing to engage in dialogue facilitated by 
Turkey. At the same time, his accent on the importance of financial assistance as an instrument 
of influence points to the concept of regional cooperation and interdependence, also an essential 
element of the Strategic Depth doctrine.
247
 
Davutoğlu further argues that, along with protecting the Albanian ethnic element in 
countries where it is a minority, most importantly in Macedonia, Turkey should engage in a 
diplomatic initiative between Albania and Macedonia. This is a very important point in the 
context of previous initiatives such as the active engagement in Bosnia and with the looming 
ethnic tensions persisting in the Republic of Macedonia. Macedonians continue to have a  tense 
relation with the country’s sizeable Albanian minority that has been moderated by the latter’s 
active participation in government: both central and local, as well as by the country’s relatively 
liberal constitution of 1991, amended in 2001 in line with the Ohrid Agreement, to include even 
more protections for minority rights.
 248
  Nevertheless, relations with the Albanian minority 
remain uneasy.
249
 On the other hand, the Bulgarian minority in the country still faces persecution 
and outright hostility, especially from the central authorities in Skopje.
250
  
Both Macedonia and Kosovo have a number of smaller minorities including: Turks, 
Aromanians, Torbesh, Gorani,
251
 in addition to Greeks in southern Macedonia, and Catholic 
Albanians in several small enclaves across northern Macedonia and mostly Kosovo. As we saw 
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earlier with the Gorani,
252
 these smaller minorities can also be very vulnerable to pressure from 
the larger ethnic group dominating the country. Thus, Turkey can easily argue for the need to 
protect the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic environment of these two otherwise small states and it 
would be, again, very well positioned to do that because it has good relations with all sides
253
 
and possesses significant political and economic leverage that, as the case with the EU led talks 
with Prishtina and Belgrade demonstrates, is crucial for success. 
Turkey has maintained strong ties with both Macedonia and Kosovo from the moment 
each state announced its independence. Turkey assisted Macedonia with the Kosovo refugee 
crisis over the course of the war (1998-1999) when some 300,000 Kosovar Albanians fled across 
the border to Macedonia, a large portion of which were given asylum in Turkey.
254
  
Turkey’s engagement in Kosovo and Macedonia is most visible in the economic, cultural 
and educational fields. Turkish banking has a substantial influence in both countries, in addition 
to the already mentioned construction sector, especially in Kosovo, as well as transportation: 
Turkish companies have won contracts to operate the airports in Prishtina, Skopje, and Ohrid.
255
 
Both countries have visa-free regimes with Turkey which has brought huge increase in 
the exchange of tourists.
256
 If the reader is already asking: what do these matters have to do with 
interethnic relations in the region, I would say that they have everything to do with the subject of 
this thesis. Increased communication and tourism often have the potential to annihilate prejudice 
and negative historical memories, something that has been experienced recently by thousands of 
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Bulgarians and Serbs who enjoyed the visa-free regime with Turkey and have discovered a 
friendly, rich, well-developed, and relatively cheap country with whom both peoples share more 
than they would have previously thought. The effect has not been less significant for citizens of 
Macedonia and Kosovo. There has also been a marked increase in the interest of Bosnian citizens 
for tourist destinations in Turkey.
257
 
Shared popular culture is also important. One of the micro-topics I discussed in my 
meetings with policy advisors and analysts from several think tanks in Ankara was the influence 
of soap operas on the mentalities of various Balkan peoples. This has also become the subject of 
discussion for many foreign policy analysts in the region as the effects of the spreading 
popularity of Turkish soap operas have started to change perceptions about Turkey, not only in 
the larger Balkan region but also in the Middle East, North Africa, and even globally.
258
 
Turkey has a thriving industry producing relatively high-quality television series with 
substantial budgets that closely resemble movies. A good example for this trend is the rising in 
popularity soap opera The Magnificent Century
259
 presenting the reign of one of the greatest 
sultans in Ottoman history, Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566). The series presents the main 
historical events that took place in this epoch, noticeably without idealizing any of the historical 
characters; the Sultan, his powerful spouse Hürrem Sultan, his princes and princesses, his closest 
aides, the Grand Viziers, and all the other historical characters are represented as human beings 
with strengths and flaws. The series also does not shy away from showing the more violent face 
of Ottoman rule, something skilfully avoided both by academia and politicians from Turkey. 
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This avoidance has cultivated a myth of an ideal Ottoman past, which could be at the root of the 
rather naïve rhetoric employed by Davutoğlu and Erdoğan that we already noted, rhetoric that 
has damaged a lot of hard and positive work. In a sense, this soap opera with historical thematic 
is arguably doing better in winning in the Balkans a bit of sympathy for the Ottoman cause as 
they have made it a point not to idealize this past. The creators of the series present the Empire’s 
strong sides but also some of its negative sides like religious fanaticism and, at times, extreme 
brutality. At the same time the main characters are depicted as human beings with their strengths 
and weaknesses, characters with whom regular people can associate. The series is quite popular 
in Bosnia among both Muslims and Serbs. In one of its most recent episodes Sultan Süleyman 
addressing his Grand Vizier, Rüstem Pasha points to a collection of beautiful flowers of different 
colors and varieties saying: “In the lands that I rule, regardless of tongue and faith, Christians, 
Muslims, and Jews should be able to live together in peace and happiness, just like these flowers. 
Harmony and variety are the greatest richness.”260 
Sultan Süleyman’s remark refers to his recent acceptance of a number of refugees from 
Spain. The Ottoman Empire’s act of good will to accept the Sephardic Jews who were forced out 
of Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is a well-established historical fact, 
as well as the prominent role these large Jewish communities played henceforth in the large 
imperial city centers like Thessaloniki, where the Jewish community was the largest ethnic group 
until the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars.
261
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Thus, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has recently won an unlikely ally in Turkey’s thriving 
soap operas industry which, according to some scholars, is simply “increasing Turkey’s 
popularity in the region.”262 I still remember my shock when I entered a restaurant accompanied 
by two KFOR soldiers and discovered that Serbians in the northern Kosovo town of Ljeposavić 
are just as fond of Turkish soap operas as anyone else in the region. Local people were watching 
a famous Turkish soap opera with Serbian subtitles. Northern Kosovo is known to be a 
stronghold of Serbian nationalism and yet it appears that the Turkish soap opera industry has 
taken this stronghold by storm. 
Another important form of influence and soft power largely employed in the entire region 
of the Western Balkans by Turkey is through the country’s many and powerful foundations and 
cultural centers. Let us briefly recall one of the more important points made in Strategic Depth: 
“Every mosque destroyed, every Islamic institution that disappears, every Ottoman tradition that 
is destroyed in a cultural sense in the Balkans means the destruction of a base stone of Turkish 
cross-border influence in the region.”263 
The preservation of Ottoman heritage is taken seriously by the Turkish government, and 
its auxiliary foundations like the TİKA or the Emre Foundations264 have embarked on campaigns 
of collecting private funds to restore mosques and madrasas across Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Albania. The Gülen Movement’s powerful educational institutions have also 
made headway in these areas along with the Turgut Özal Education foundation.
265
 Parallel to 
exporting culture and education, the Turkish government has awarded thousands of scholarships 
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to citizens of Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Albania to study in prestigious Turkish 
universities like Boğaziçi University in Istanbul. These young students educated in Turkey are 
seen as  future capital for influence in the region. Of course, the initiative is also clearly helping 
these small countries, as there can only be benefits to a more educated workforce. 
These mechanisms for soft power influence are not always directed by the government 
but their effect can often be even greater than that of diplomatic initiatives and openings. In the 
case of Kosovo and Macedonia, Turkey’s influence has been mostly indirect with a large role 
played by soft power institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
Despite its multi-cultural and multi-ethnic legacy, the Balkans remain a region of fragile 
ethnic peace. As the recently rising tensions along ethnic lines in Bulgaria demonstrate, 
especially in countries with weak economies and lower income levels, conflict may erupt at any 
time.
266
 
For centuries Balkan nations have lived under the impression that their fate is being 
decided by more powerful countries and that there is little they can do to avoid becoming an 
object of international relations rather than playing any substantial role in them. In this respect, 
the most important concept of Turkish foreign policy engagement in the Western Balkans is 
“regional ownership” of peace initiatives and the idea that problems in the Balkans should be 
solved by Balkan countries themselves. However, such peace and reconciliation initiatives can 
only be led by a strong country that would have the leverage to influence other actors and 
compel them to work together. As we saw in the case of the trilateral consultations mechanism, 
Serbia is mostly compelled by Turkey’s potential for economic cooperation and investment. In 
addition, as I noted earlier, Turkey is perceived as a different kind of political actor, familiar with 
the problems of the region, as it is seen as part of the Balkans, and also “one of us”.267 
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Turkey has notable ambitions to emerge as a regional leader that can only be seen as 
normal with regard to its size and vibrant economy. Turkey’s success in future initiatives will 
depend on its ability to address the importance of the Ottoman historical and cultural legacy in a 
more adequate manner. Rather than idealizing what is a controversial past, Turkish diplomats 
would do better to expand some of the other important concepts of the Strategic depth doctrine 
like the ability to grasp the flow of events — “flexibility”, — and, most importantly, regional 
cooperation and seeking solutions to problems through intense diplomacy and engagement with 
all important actors in the region. Neo-Ottomanist rhetoric has already done great damage to 
positive and fruitful efforts. Thus, it appears that is now time to reflect on the mistakes made and 
go ahead with the lessons from this experience. 
As Bedrudin Brljavac rightfully notes, in order to succeed in establishing itself as a 
constructive regional leader and a model country, Turkey needs to address its internal issues,
268
 
which does not seem likely anymore with the present government and prime minister in power. 
Perhaps the greatest self-inflicted damage, most of all to Turkey’s leverage in international 
relations, currently is the reputational and economic impact of the internal turmoil that started 
last May. The Turkish government’s response to the Gezi protests has definitely had a negative 
effect on the image of the country and its leverage in Balkan affairs. However, the civil protests 
could also be seen as a positive development in terms of Turkish politics as they show a 
determination by the public not to tolerate anything short of real civil liberties, freedom of 
speech and free media.
269
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At the moment, after its success in recent local elections in March 30, 2014, AKP seems 
to be retaining its hold on power after proving capable of amassing enough popular support to 
retain control over most of the big cities in the country.
270
 The corruption allegations against the 
current government, together with its increasingly violent methods and the encroachment on civil 
liberties, the judiciary, and police indicate that the turmoil will likely continue.
271
  
However, even if a government change were to happen, I do not anticipate a major 
change in terms of foreign policy priorities and it is reasonable to expect that a highly developed 
economy like Turkey’s can recover and allow the country to continue to be an important player 
in the region.
272
 Recently, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has continued his frequent visits in 
neighbor countries,
273
 as energetic as ever and the continuity that we discussed earlier in terms of 
the evolution of Turkish foreign policy and engagement in the neighborhood will likely bring 
similar policies in the future, even after a fundamental government change. 
The trend created by Turkey’s active engagement in the Western Balkans and its bid to 
facilitate good neighborly and interethnic relations in the region will affect both relations in the 
region in general, as well as future initiatives led by Turkey, provided that it manages to achieve 
a certain maturity and tone down the historically related rhetoric searching for a reasonable 
middle ground rather than idealizing the Ottoman past.  
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In conclusion, both the European Union and the United States need an ally that is 
positioned to be at the same time an influential country and one that is considered “one of us”274 
by local states but also by local peoples and ethnicities. Turkey should be assisted in its 
mediation efforts as it continues to be a key ally in a common quest for more stable relations in 
the region and sustainable development. The idea of multi-faceted approach to foreign policy is a 
reasonable and innovative concept as economic prosperity is a key element in overcoming ethnic 
tensions. The lack of sustainable economic development always carries the potential for 
instability as recent events in Bosnia and Bulgaria show. During his visit to Turkey in March 
2011, Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković rightfully notes that “good relations between 
Serbia and Turkey constitute a critical contribution to stability in the Balkans.”275  Turkey’s 
trilateral consultations mediation initiatives can be seen as a beginning of a good trend in 
neighborly relations in the region. The very Balkan concept of komşu — your neighbor as 
someone with whom it is very natural to maintain good and open relations — promoted by an 
economically powerful Turkey still has the potential to bring good fruits and lead the region to a 
better future. 
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